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Abstract 
Buses and in general at-grade public transportation remain the most important component 
of transit services in all the urban areas, whether they are feeder to a heavy rail system or 
an independent network. However, the steady increase in travel demand, essentially 
private automobile, has results in a growing level of congestion, affecting both cars and 
public transportation.  
In response, cities like Curitiba and Zurich moved in the late 70's towards the 
implementation of preferential treatment. To do that, they introduced innovative policies 
in order to give the full priority to transit. Preferential treatment is a broad definition that 
combines all the means to insure that priority is given to transit (queue jump, traffic 
signal priority, exclusive lane, tramways…). The main concerns about Zurich and 
Curitiba are that they both achieved their implementation through particular policy-
making processes; moreover the generalization of these types of policies has been very 
limited.  
The objectives of this thesis are to apply the three models from the agenda-building 
theory (Mobilization, Inside Access and Outside Initiative) to the context of public 
transportation to understand how innovative policy-making can be introduced and if the 
presence of a policy entrepreneur is necessary and sufficient.  
Using 11 cities in Europe and America that have implemented preferential treatment as 
case studies, the thesis identified elements necessary to address the public reaction, the 
institutional fragmentation and the decision-makers' positions. The research shows the 
necessity of public consultations and comprehensive planning exercises to convince the 
different stakeholders. Moreover, it points out the benefits of initiatives such as 
benchmarking or national legislation. 
Eventually, the thesis concludes that the policy-making theory can be expanded in 
acknowledging a combination of models to describe the preferential treatment's 
implementation process. On the other hand, the context of public transportation has 
evolved enough (concentration of decision powers and increasing public support) so that 
transit agencies can move towards implementation in focusing on stakeholder 
management strategies instead of relying on a policy entrepreneur. 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Joseph F. Coughlin 
Title: Principal Research Associate, Center for Transportation and Logistics 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
1.1. Preferential Treatment 
1.1.1. Definition 
Preferential treatment is a broad definition that combines all the means to insure that 
priority is given to transit. It includes a wide range of measures: from the queue jump to 
exclusive right-of-ways and from Bus Rapid Transit to Light Rail Transit. 
 
1.1.2. Why Does Preferential Treatment Matter? 
When heavy rail is not an option… 
Due to the high capital investments needed, most of the cities cannot rely on heavy rail 
infrastructure to provide public transportation services. Hence, at-grade transit is in many 
cases the backbone of the public transportation networks. However, unlike subways or 
elevated lines, buses and LRT strongly suffer from the car-created congestion. The 
reliability and the commercial speed decrease dramatically, lowering the attractiveness of 
public transportation in those cities.  
 
When heavy rail is an option… 
In large cities, when one wants to deal with public urban transportation, it is often found 
that subway is the only robust alternative. Indeed, heavy rail transit system, through a 
higher capital investment, brings more capacity and is much more appealing! So why 
should one focus on at-grade transit systems? Figure 1 represents the distribution of 
traffic volume (passenger-kilometers per capita) between bus and metro, in major 
metropolitan areas that are served by a heavy rail system. 15 of the 26 cities represented 
(58%) are located under the first bisector; meaning their bus system carries more 
ridership than their heavy rail system. Cities located above the first bisector still relies on 
the bus system, illustrating that a metro system cannot be self-sufficient in term of 
networks. A short outlook points out the fact that  metros are limited to corridors and 
must rely on at-grade transit for a feeder system to extend service to broader areas. 
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Figure 1: Volume Distribution Among Transit Modes 1 
 
Preferential Treatment and the Degradation cycle 
At-grade transit may be the main component of public transportation in the vast majority 
of metropolitan areas in the world; it is also the most exposed to car congestion. The 
steady decline in public transportation could be summarized by the simple following 
figure (figure 2):  
                                               
1
 Source: UITP Millennium Cities Database. The following cities have been used: Brussels, Lyon, 
Marseille, Paris, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, Athens, Milan, Amsterdam, Oslo, Barcelona, Madrid, 
Stockholm, Glasgow, London, Newcastle, Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, 
New York, San Francisco, Washington 
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Figure 2: The vicious cycle of urban decline2 
Therefore, to keep an attractive transit system (with or without heavy rail), it is important 
to limit the car traffic impacts on public transportation. In this context, preferential 
treatment gives the opportunity to challenge the car domination in the city and to 
insure attractiveness of public transportation. 
 
1.2. Curitiba and Zurich Experiences 
1.2.1. Transit Innovations 
Curitiba and Zurich are among the first cities to have questioned the sustainability of a 
city developed around cars. In the 1970's, their transportation policy innovations were to 
give priority to transit. Curitiba implemented a cheap and efficient high-capacity bus 
network; Zurich revived its tramway system built before the WWII. Since, Curitiba has 
become one of the wealthiest cities in Brazil and Zurich has preserved its urban 
attractiveness. 
 
1.2.2. Brazilian Entrepreneur or Swiss Democracy? 
The main concerns about Zurich and Curitiba are that they both achieved their 
implementation through particular policy-making processes. Indeed, during the 1970's, 
the dictatorship in Brazil allowed Curitiba's mayor to push for an aggressive 
                                               
2
 Source: Based on Better Mobility in Urban Areas, International Association for Public Transport, 2001 
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implementation, which eventually convinced the citizen. On the other hand, Swiss 
democratic model allowed the citizens to direct legislative process according to their 
wishes through referendum. Therefore, the citizens refused to accommodate more car 
capacity but pushed for reviving the public transportation. 
 
1.3. How Can Other Cities Benefits? 
The importance of at-grade transit and the benefits that preferential treatment accrues 
should have convinced worldwide transportation decision-makers. Moreover, preferential 
treatment has been successfully implemented in few other cities in both developed and 
developing countries. Technical barriers that can compromise the implementation are 
quite limited, as the technology is nowadays widely available and affordable. But is the 
technology the only factor? The following article (Urban Transportation Monitor, 1992) 
relates an interesting anecdote: the attempt to implement Bus Rapid Transit in Manhattan 
by importing Curitiba's transit system. 
 
Bus Tube Reduces Travel Time 
Comparable to an above Ground Subway 
 
A new concept in urban bus transport – the bus tub- was successfully tested in New York 
City recently. 
The bus tube is comparable to an above ground subway; passengers pay as they enter the 
protected tube station. The tube station platform and the bus doors are at the same 
elevation. When the bus pulls alongside the tube, the bus operator open the bus and tube 
doors using a radio signal, and the passengers walk directly onto the bus fully utilizing 
both front and rear doors. The bus driver does not interrupt service to collect fares or 
hand out transfers thus speeding up travel time. […] 
The bus tube was developed by the Brazilian city of Curitiba, and testing it was a 
cooperative venture involving Curitiba, the New York City Department of Transportation, 
New York City Transit Authority, the Port Authority if New York and New Jersey, and an 
international non-profit organization called the Mega-Cities Project, dedicated to finding 
low-cost innovative solutions to improve urban life. 
The system reduces travel time and provides more convenient bus service for 
passengers. The reduced dwell time required by buses at the tube station results in 
increased roadway capacity which benefits motorists as well as bus riders. 
The bus tube was tested for six weeks from April 20 to May 29, 1992. Passengers had a 
positive reaction to the bus tube. Gerard Schoffian, assistant commissioner of the New 
York City Department of Transportation said that "the tube raised the profile of bus 
travel in New York City. Their physical presence demonstrated the importance of 
transit and how attractive and convenient it can be." 
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A decade after, one can still argue why the system was not permanently implement after 
such a successful test. Implementation of preferential treatment is not and cannot be 
summarized as a technical aspect. Policies supporting this initiative are crucial for 
cities that envisages implementing preferential treatment. Hence, the need to study 
policy-making processes for other cities to benefit. 
 
1.4. Outlines 
To address the issue of preferential treatment as a public policy-making process, the 
thesis will first define in chapter 2 the technological aspects of preferential treatment. In 
chapter 3, the thesis will come back on the policy-making theory with an extensive 
literature review Afterwards, the problems and methodology theory will be set out in 
chapter 4. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are dedicated to the case studies, each one of them looking 
at a specific type of agenda-building model. The thesis will focus back on the hypotheses 
in the light of the case studies in chapter 8. At the same time it will give the main findings 
of the research. Eventually, the thesis will bring some conclusions to the research in the 
last chapter. 
 
1.5. References 
Urban Transportation Monitor, 1992: Article in "The Urban Transportation Monitor", 
07/10/92 
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Chapter 2:  Preferential Treatment: A Transit Review 
 
2.1. What Is Preferential Treatment? 
2.1.1. Definition 
Preferential treatment is a broad definition that gathers all the means insuring that priority 
is given to transit. It includes a wide range of measures: from the queue jump to the Light 
Rail Transit. It can be divided technically three categories: 
• Operational improvements 
• Bus Rapid Transit 
• Light Rail Transit 
 
2.1.2. Operational improvements 
Operation improvements are characterized by no capital investments (or very limited) in 
the transit infrastructure. 
 
Bus Design 
The bus design is critical for transit service. It is part of preferential treatment as it has 
impacts on boarding and unboarding times. The following pictures (pictures 1 and 2) 
show different systems used by transit agencies. Washington's buses only load by the 
front door and unload by the back door to allow payment control by the driver. However, 
many people used the front door to go down, interfering with boarding customers. In 
Lyon, low floor buses opens two sets of doors, allowing a fast load/unload and a short 
dwelling time. 
 
Picture 1: MetroBus, Washington 
 
Picture 2: TCL, Lyon 
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Fare Collection 
The fare collection has also a significant impact on the level-of-service by extending or 
reducing dwelling times. Money collectors can be located inside the vehicle under the 
driver's control (Picture 3). Another alternative developed by operators is the use of proof 
of payment (Picture 4), with which service is paid outside the vehicle and can be 
controlled (most of the time on random bases) later on board by entitled officers. 
 
Picture 3: Inside fare collection, Boston 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 4:  Proof of payment, Lyon 
 
Bus Queue Jump 
The bus queue jump allows avoiding long queue 
of vehicles at signalized intersections. The bus 
uses the right-turn lane without the requirement 
to turn right. At the green light, it moves ahead 
the queue.  
Two necessary conditions have to be met: the 
right turn lane must be long enough and not 
obstructed by the queue; then the traffic signal 
system must give a green time priority for the 
bus to bypass the cars. 
 
Figure 3: Queue Jump3 
                                               
3
 Transit Capacity and Quality of Service Manual, Part 2: Bus Transit Capacity 
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Bus Signal Priority 
When a bus reaches a signalized 
intersection, the signal can give the 
priority and allow the bus to follow 
seamlessly. There are two different 
categories of traffic control system: 
1. The passive system: pretimed 
modifications of the signal system 
that can be adjusted manually. 
2. The active system: the signal 
adjusts itself automatically after 
sensing the arrival of the bus. 
 
Figure 4: Traffic Signal Priority 4 
Signal priority allows a delay control and can significantly improve the schedule 
adherence. However, transit sake may imply a larger delay for others users. 
 
Curb Extension 
 
Figure 5: Curb Extension5 
In lanes with intense traffic, the bus 
encounters delay in trying to reinsert 
in the traffic lane. With a curb 
extension, the bus avoids to pull to 
the curb to stop. 
The main disadvantage remains the 
need of two lanes in the bus direction 
in order to avoid complete disruption 
of the car flow. 
 
                                               
4
 Transit Capacity and Quality of Service Manual, Part 2: Bus Transit Capacity 
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Boarding Island 
 
Figure 6: Boarding Island 6 
The boarding island uses the same 
principle as the curb extension. In this 
case, a special attention must be brought 
to the safety of travelers. 
 
2.1.3. Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) 
The Bus Rapid Transit is considered as a preferential treatment with substantial 
infrastructure improvements and with most of the operational improvements described 
above included. Bus Rapid Transit often runs on exclusive lanes or an adequate 
infrastructure separating them from the automobile traffic. BRT dwell times can easily 
reach the rail transit ones and the solution can result in high speed and high utilization 
rates. Bi- or tri-articulated bus can carry up to 270 passengers. There are three types of 
dedicated lanes for BRT. 
 
No use of the adjacent lane 
The bus lane may be used in countraflow and is physically channelized. The alternative 
allows speeds of 70 km/h and bus traffic of 70 buses/h. To give an order of comparison 
the average frequency in a mixed traffic is 60 bus/h. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
5
 Transit Capacity and Quality of Service Manual, Part 2: Bus Transit Capacity 
6
 Transit Capacity and Quality of Service Manual, Part 2: Bus Transit Capacity 
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Partial use of the adjacent lane 
Depending on the use of the other traffic, right-turn can be prohibited or not. Frequencies 
are close to 100 bus/h. 
 
Full use of the adjacent lane 
In this case, the right-turn is prohibited and some authorized vehicle can run on the 
busways. A frequency of 180 bus/h can be expected if the law (e.g. to avoid parking on 
the lane) is strictly enforced. 
 
2.1.4. Light Rail Transit (LRT) 
Defined by the Transportation Research Board (TRB, 1994), the Light Rail Transit is a 
rail mode: 
"characterized by its ability to operate single cars or short trains along exclusive 
rights-of-way at ground level, on aerial structures, in subways, or occasionally in 
streets" [along with vehicular traffic]. 
The main difference with heavy rail system remains the electric system (voltage and 
source). Indeed, LRT uses overhead cables whereas heavy rail uses a third rail. 
The LRT was known under the name of "tramway" when it was build in the first part of 
the XXth century. According to the International Association for Public Transportation 
(UITP), LRT remains the modern term. However, the word "tramway" is still used in 
France and will be used indifferently later. 
 
Figure 7: Exclusive Right-of-Way 7 
In the alternative above (figure 7), the alignment uses a full grade separation with car 
traffic. Safety and commercial speed are here privileged in avoiding any conflict with the 
car flow. 
                                               
7
 Source: TCRP Report 17, "Integration of Light Rail Transit into City Streets." Chapter 2: System Safety 
and Operating Experience 
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Figure 8: Semi-Exclusive Right-of-Way8 
In figure 8, the alignments use limited grade crossing. The conflicts are limited to these 
zones; in the other zones the LRT operates as fully separated. 
 
Figure 9: Non-Exclusive Right-of-Way (Mixed Traffic) 9 
 
The last type of LRT (figure 9) runs on non-exclusive alignments. The transit flow is 
mixed with car and pedestrian flows. The operating speed is therefore lower but transit 
services reach high-density areas like CBD and develop a friendlier environment. 
 
2.1.5. Aerial and Underground Networks 
Many metropolitan areas own aerial or underground networks. One could also include 
them as the ultimate preferential treatment. However, it will not be considered in the 
definition of preferential treatment because the implementation issues are different: 
sharing right-of-ways with the traffic and financial burden/construction disruptions. 
 
2.2. Why Is Preferential Treatment Desirable? 
2.2.1. Not Longer, Faster! 
Transportation demand is strongly driven by the value of time. The International 
Association for Public Transport (UITP, 2001), using the Millennium Cities Database, 
made clear that the most competitive public transportation networks, i.e. with the highest 
modal share, are the one offering the highest commercial speed. 
                                               
8
 Source: Ibid 
9
 Source: Ibid 
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Their results have been adapted by focusing only on the 26 cities in Europe and America 
in the Millennium Cities Database that have implemented preferential treatment (bus 
exclusive lanes, tramway or LRT). In figure 10 the transit modal share is hardly 
correlated to the ratio between public transportation and highway infrastructures.  
Percentage of motorized public modes over all trips
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Figure 10: Relation between infrastructure and modal share10 
On the other hand, figure 11 shows a much higher correlation between the ratio of pubic 
transportation speed over automobile speed and modal share. This simple study 
underlines the fact that building is not a guaranty for high transit ridership but giving 
the priority is!  
                                               
10
 Source: Millennium Cities Database, UITP, 2001 
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Figure 11: Relation between speeds and modal share11 
 
2.2.2. The Urban Cycle of Degradation 
Earlier, we saw that slower transit implies less ridership, but the relations between transit 
and the urban environment are much more complex. Indeed, low ridership often leads to 
lower service, starting the more general decline of public transportation. The several 
dimensions of car traffic impacts on the urban transportation are more broadly illustrated 
on figure 12: land use, employment and environment.  
Preferential treatment represents an opportunity to break the cycle and therefore revives 
public transportation. Its main action is to break the relationship between car traffic and 
transit by giving a protection to public transportation from the consequences of an 
increase in car use. Thus, transit can remain competitive and attractive through a better 
level-of-service (higher commercial speed, schedule adherence, high frequency…). 
 
                                               
11
 Source: Millennium Cities Database, UITP, 2001. Coefficient of Correlation: 0.467, Coefficient of 
Correlation Without Sao Paolo and Hamburg: 0.599 
Hamburg 
Sao Paolo 
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Figure 12: The vicious cycle of urban decline12 
 
                                               
12
 Source: Better Mobility in Urban Areas, International Association for Public Transport, 2001 
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2.3. Preferential Treatment's Challenges 
2.3.1. Technology 
Preferential treatment must rely on different aspects of technology to insure that priority 
is physically given to transit. Nevertheless, the different technological components are 
nowadays widely available and affordable. Fare collections and street designs do not 
require a state-of-the-art technology: the implementations in Quito and Curitiba only 
required minimal technology (paper proof-of-payment, tube stations). Moreover, smart-
cards can provide useful tools in implementing an efficient network. Vehicle technology 
(rubber or steel) is not an issue anymore, it is more related to transit attractiveness 
towards users, but has little influence on preferential treatment (high-capacity bus in 
Curitiba can carry more persons than some LRT systems). Traffic priority was a 
challenge two decades ago (when Zurich chose to implement preferential treatment, they 
had to develop the whole traffic signaling technology); today technologies such as Global 
Positioning System (GPS), Automated Vehicle Location (AVL), network algorithms and 
computers' capabilities are widely developed for limited costs. 
 
2.3.2. Institutions 
Institutions differ in every countries and it would be impossible to enumerate on them all. 
However, there are commonalities between each city in the way of addressing 
transportation issues. We can define the major actors at four geographical levels of 
power: local, metropolitan, regional and national (table 1). 
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Components of 
Preferential Treatment 
Institutions Involved 
Bus Design Transit Authority 
Fare Collection Transit Authority 
Bus Queue Jump 
Transit Authority 
Traffic Department, Local 
Public Work Department, Local 
Bus Signal Priority 
Transit Authority 
Traffic Department, Local 
Curb Extension 
Transit Authority 
Public Work Department, Local 
Boarding Island 
Transit Authority 
Public Work Department, Local 
BRT and LRT 
Transit Authority 
Traffic Department, Local 
Public Work Department, Local 
Planning Authority 
Metropolitan Authority 
Regional Government 
National Government 
Table 1: Institutions involved in preferential treatment 
The first six components are the competencies of local authorities because they are 
operational improvements at a discrete level (intersections, bus stops, route sections…). 
BRT and LRT are system-wide improvements, and thus involve many more institutions 
because different cities or municipalities are likely to be served by a corridor or a network 
and institutions in each city are involved. On the other hand, there often is a metropolitan 
government above several local jurisdictions (the Metropolitan Planning Organization in 
the USA or the "Communauté Urbaine" in France). Generally, higher regional authorities 
(the State Department of Transportation in the USA or the Region in France) are also 
concerned because the system impacts regionally. Eventually, the cost of infrastructures 
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is bringing at the table national authorities, such as the Federal Transit Authority or the 
Ministry of Transportation. 
The real challenges for preferential treatment are the management of all the stakeholders 
stated above, as conflicting interests are likely to arise opposition to the implementation 
of preferential treatment: 
• The Traffic Department may not want to restrict cars in an already saturated 
network 
• The Public Works Department may not want to redesign streets that could impacts 
on its management 
• The Metropolitan Authority could hold conflicting interests within its members 
• Reaching a financial agreement among the stakeholders could create potential 
conflicts… 
 
2.3.3. Other Issues 
In addition to institutional and technological issues, preferential treatment also faces 
several issues that regular public transportation faces everyday. We can identify two: 
Transportation and Integration, Transportation and Sustainability. 
First, for public transportation to be really attractive, the integration of services (fares, 
traveler information, infrastructure) is crucial. It is all the more true for preferential 
treatment since the cooperation of many agencies is required. On the other hand, 
preferential treatment is raising the question of urban quality of life. Preferential 
treatment and public transportation are related to broader issues such as the land use 
patterns and environmental policies (urban air pollution and climate change). In principle, 
many transportation policy-makers could be in favor of preferential treatment for at-grade 
transit, given the benefits that accrue. However, questioning the car usage in cities 
remains highly controversial. In particular, preferential treatment highlights the need to 
orient city development around sustainable modes (transit and non-motorized modes), 
instead of trying to match car demands. 
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2.4. Curitiba's and Zurich's Success Stories 
Transit preferential treatment has been crystallized by two examples of implementation in 
the 1970's. Indeed, Curitiba and Zurich were among the first cities to implement full 
priority for transit, and nowadays the developments of these cities are quoted as 
references by the public transportation world. 
 
2.4.1. Curitiba 
The system in Curitiba is considered in the USA as what public transportation should be. 
The implementation of a high-capacity bus network, not only efficient but also profitable 
has pushed the U.S. Government to envision BRT as a potential solution to tackle 
growing mobility concerns with limited funds. Actually, in the 1990's U.S. Federal 
Transit Administration members visited by the city of Curitiba and came back 
enthusiastic about what can be achieved with a bus system. In consequent, they launched 
BRT pilot projects to revive public transportation in several cities. 
 
2.4.2. Zurich 
Zurich influence is much stronger in Europe, as Zurich was until the 70's a normal 
European city, developed on the same patterns and facing the same transportation issues. 
The will of the Swiss to limit cars in their city and to redirect massive funds dedicated to 
road capacity to enhance the public transportation system have put Zurich on a pedestal 
as a model to follow on transportation and environment issues. Moreover, public 
transportation integration has successfully raised the level-of-service. 
 
2.4.3. Challenges 
Nevertheless, Zurich and Curitiba may appear as successes in terms of preferential 
treatment and more broadly in terms or urban quality of life, but most of the 
transportation professionals acknowledge the peculiarities of those cities. Indeed, in the 
1970's Curitiba was a fast growing city in a developing country. Moreover, an 
entrepreneur called Lerner took benefits from the Brazilian dictatorship to impose his 
policy innovation to the city. On the other hand, Zurich example appears as singular as 
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Swiss policy-making is in Europe. Citizens go to vote almost every weekend to decide 
the orientation of the city's, the canton's and the country's policies. 
 
2.5. References 
TRB, 1994: Transportation Research Board, Light Rail Transit Committee, 
Transportation Research Record 1433, Transportation Research Board, National 
Research Council, Washington D.C. 1994 
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Chapter 3:  Policy-Making, a Literature Review 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Policy-making theory focuses on understanding how decision-makers act to solve 
society's problems. Several models have been elaborated since the 1950's and this chapter 
will address three kinds of policy-making models: 
• Rational Choice Models 
• Incremental Models 
• Agenda-Building Models 
Whereas the first two kinds of models scrutinize the essence of decision-making (i.e. 
focused on the decision-makers' behavior and abilities), the last category focuses more on 
the internal process of decision-making (i.e. on the interaction among the actors). 
 
3.2. Rational Choice Models 
3.2.1. Decision-Making Concept 
Jones (Jones, 1994) summarizes Herbert Simon's concept of decision-making in writing 
that policy-makers behave on purpose – the Homo Politicus is rational – adopting 
strategies that can help them achieve their goals. According to Herbert Simon (Simon, 
1965), decision-making finds its intrinsic definition in the concepts of facts and values. 
Decisions link the facts to the values, as a decision-maker notice facts and acts to move 
towards his values (what he believes is "good"). Studying decision-making processes 
appears not possible with scientific use, as it is based on the notion of value. However, 
Simon insists that the real process should take relatively to the values, in order to be 
scientifically explored. 
 
3.2.2. Rational Behavior 
Simon also considers that the rational behavior can be used to explain the link between 
the means and the end. This model, in order to be realistic, has to include several factors: 
• The comparison between alternatives means to achieve efficiency 
• The relation between the means and the end 
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The decisions are expressed as the choices of one of the alternatives. To look at more 
complex decisions, Simon also defines strategies as a reformulation of a series of 
decisions. Hence, the task of decision-making is to choose a strategy by: 
1. Considering all the possible strategies 
2. Defining the potential consequences of these strategies (with respect to the 
end) 
3. Comparing these strategies. 
Rationality, according to Simon, is the process of evaluating all the consequences of these 
alternatives towards the value defined by the decision-makers. 
 
3.2.3. Limits Of The Model 
The concept of rationality is bounded and Simon acknowledges the model's limits as 
decision-makers cannot take into account all the alternatives and cannot evaluate all the 
consequences of an alternative. This rationality is coupled with individuals' psychology to 
fill those lacks, which makes difficult the scientific understanding of decision-making. 
 
3.3. Incremental Models 
3.3.1. Failure Of The Rational Models 
Lindblom (Lindblom, 1959) points out the different failures of the rational models, 
exposed by Simon (Simon, 1965). First, the rational model (or root model) can address 
only small-scale issues. A large problem entails too much complexity for the human 
capabilities. The rational approach is supposed to look at all important things and it is 
practically not feasible. On the other hand, the root model is based on the relationship 
between the means and the end and often problems can face conflicting values that 
cannot be addressed by rational strategies.  
 
3.3.2. Successive Limited Comparison Model 
Cobb and Elder (Cobb and Elder, 1983) broach the incremental model in pointing out that 
decision-makers face time constraints and incomplete information. Indeed, Lindblom 
(Lindblom, 1959) suggests that these constraints and limited human capacities result for 
the policy-maker in acting incrementally. Therefore, Lindblom suggests that decisions are 
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made incrementally. His model, the successive limited comparison model or branch 
model, basically reduces the scope of the problem in considering a limited number of 
policies. He first chooses a limited set of strategies {X0, … , XN}, – of which he has 
knowledge of the consequences – and he implements them with a dichotomy method. To 
achieve a goal G, a first strategy X0 will result in Y0 and create some unexpected 
consequences, therefore a second strategy X1 is implemented to correct the side effects of 
Y0 and to tend further towards G. The notion of process relies on trade-offs that the 
decision-maker is willing to make to move towards the goal G. Lindblom's conceptions 
defines a continuous policy-making process, that, contrary to the root model, does not 
evolves by leaps and bounds, but smoothly.  
The main concern about the model is that it does not allowed any policy innovations. In 
fact, if one follows the incremental logic, there can be only marginal improvements of a 
situation resulting from a policy. Lindblom argues that non-incremental policies are 
irrelevant because they bear unpredictable consequences.  
 
3.4. Focusing On The Agenda-Building 
Policy-making as a process is not easily identifiable and we have seen that the literature 
generally focused on the decision-makers and on the results of public policies. However, 
the process and the environment that led a decision-maker to act is crucial as it defines 
which problems to scope. Kingdon (Kingdon, 1995) describes public policy making as a 
four-step process including: 
• Setting the agenda 
• Alternatives specification 
• Choice from alternatives 
• Implementation 
Two difficulties arise in public policy analysis. First, literature tends to study successes 
only; indeed little work has been done on failures. On the other hand, each of the four 
steps must be considered with attention. Kingdon asserts that success in one of the stage 
does not guaranty a success in the process, pointing out the complex nature of the 
process. 
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3.4.1. Definitions 
Issues or Problems 
Policy-making process is focused on solving problem or issue. The question "When is 
there a problem or an issue?" could be reformulated as "When is there a need to act?" The 
following definition of the term "problem" is given by Kingdon (Kingdon, 1995):  
"a mismatch between the observed condition and one's conception of an 
ideal state" 
Another definition of an issue is given by Cobb and Elder (Cobb and Elder, 1983): 
"an issue is a conflict between two or more identifiable groups over 
procedural or substantive matters relating to the distribution of positions 
or resources" 
Cobb and Elder describe the creation of an issue as an interaction of a triggering device 
on an initiator: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Issue Creation13 
Henceforth, we will use the terms "issue" and "problem" without distinction. We shall 
also make a clear distinction between problems and alternatives. According to Kingdon 
(Kingdon, 1995), alternatives are related to an agenda item and represent a way of the 
decision-maker to address the problem. 
 
Agenda 
The literature gives various definitions to the term "agenda". However, some consistency 
can be found across the definitions. Indeed, the nuances in which the definition is 
declined underline the distinction that exists among the actors. Kingdon (Kingdon, 1995) 
gives the more general definition as: 
                                               
13
 Source: Participation in American Politics, The Dynamics of Agenda-Building, Cobb R.W. and Elder 
C.D., 1983, p. 85 
Initiator 
Triggering Device 
Issue Creation 
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"the list of subjects or problems to which government officials, and people 
outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying 
some serious attention at any give time". 
Consequently, he adds that agenda-setting's role is to select subjects among the multitude 
of problems for potential course of action. 
Cobb, Ross and Ross (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1977) expand the definition by making a 
distinction between the public agenda and the formal agenda. The public agenda is 
composed of issues that have been identified by the public and that are of high interests. 
To be on the public agenda, an issue must: 
• Draw widespread attention or awareness 
• Be a concern to a critical number of persons in the society 
• Be identified with a government, able to address the issue 
The formal agenda is composed of issues that have been considered by the decision-
makers for action. By making such a distinction, Cobb, Ross and Ross acknowledge the 
central relation between these two actors. 
Nelson (Nelson, 1984) uses a different vocabulary when she defines the gamut of 
agendas. She develops the definition given by Cobb and Elder (Cobb and Elder, 1983), 
who considered the systemic agenda (equivalent to the definition of public agenda given 
by Cobb, Ross and Ross (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1977)). Nevertheless, Nelson (Nelson, 
1984) differentiates within the systemic agenda, the popular agenda, related to the mass 
public, and the professional agenda, related to a public already sensitive to the issue and 
holder of a certain expertise. This new degree of accuracy introduces the various 
sensibilities that can exist within the public group. 
 
3.4.2. Actors 
The definitions have already given an insight about the importance of identifying the 
different actors when one analyses a public policy. Among the multitude of actors, we 
would focus on three in particular: the public, the interests groups and the policy 
entrepreneur. This gamut is generally sufficient to identify the actors of any public policy 
process. 
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The Public 
A broad definition of the public would be: 
"anyone in society who does not hold direct interests in the issue; i.e. 
anyone else the decision-maker and the interest groups" 
However in policy-making, the public is divided in categories depending on the level of 
participation. In defining the mass public, Cobb, Ross and Ross (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 
1977) distinguish two different entities. The Attentive Public is generally involved in 
public policies. A small proportion of the population, it already has an opinion on the 
issue and is not easily swayed. The General Public is rarely involved in the decision-
making process. Whenever an issue reaches its agenda, it is for a very limited time but 
with an great intensity. The decision-makers are often forced to consider the issue if it is 
broad enough to involve the general public. 
 
Interest Groups 
Generally, the public is not strongly involved in policy-making; instead, interest groups 
gather individuals whose stakes are potentially threatened in the particular policy. They 
can include the industry, unions, consumer groups, and political lobbyists. Kingdon 
(Kingdon, 1995) underlines the role of interest groups in decision-making as supporter of 
new items on the agenda, and most of all, supporters of solutions for these items. 
 
Policy Entrepreneur 
The policy entrepreneur is a central stakeholder of the public policy process. Kingdon 
(Kingdon, 1995) clarifies the concept of entrepreneur at a federal level. Not necessarily a 
part of the decision-making body, an entrepreneur is an advocate for a set problem, 
dedicating his time, resources and reputation. He could be from any or part of any actors 
of the process: bureaucrats, politician, lobbyist, community activist… However, if 
Kingdon is not clear about his intention, but he quotes several of his qualities:  
• Be legitimate by being representative or by holding a some level of expertise  
• Be a negotiator or have strong political ties 
• Be obstinate 
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This definition is easily applicable at all the level of policy-making; the only difference 
would be in the status of the entrepreneur (local, regional or national). 
 
3.4.3. Focusing Events and Policy Windows 
Obviously, they are many more issues than spots on the decision-maker's agenda. Thus, 
the issue and supporters must rely on opportunities to get on the policy entrepreneur's 
agenda, then on the formal agenda. 
Focusing Events 
In general, focus events crystallize a problem, that is to say bring it back on people top 
list of concerns. Problems are revealed to the public, the policy entrepreneur or the 
decision-maker by several ways: indicators, events or feedbacks. First the problem could 
appear through indicators showing a need for improvement. It can also confirm or 
evaluate the gravity of a problem. Then, feedbacks on current policies could bring to 
people's attention the inefficiencies as things stand at present. Finally, events may arise a 
problem among the multitude. Dramatic events, like a crisis or a disaster are, of course, 
catching the eyes, but also benchmarks like elections or the appointment of a new team. 
We will define focusing events as revelators of an issue, including indicators, feedbacks 
or events. 
Nelson (Nelson, 1984) also raises the notion of trigger in the organizational approach 
(equivalent to focus events). According to Nelson, there is also the need for a focusing 
event in order to catch the eyes of a political official. She mentioned disasters, 
dissatisfaction, breakthroughs in technology, as well as organization events such as 
nomination or advancement. This definition is to be related to the political official's point 
of view as described later in the organizational approach. 
 
Budget, a Particular Focusing Event 
Budget is an important focusing event in the public policy process. Kingdon (Kingdon, 
1995) reminds us that budget cannot only be an inhibitor when it is limited (many issues 
are not considered due to the lack of funds), but also a catalyst when funds are made 
available. Indeed, money that needs to be spent can push political officials to look for 
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some problems to solve. We should pay a particular attention to budget because financing 
is a central question in transportation issues. 
 
Policy Windows 
Kingdon (Kingdon, 1995) defines policy windows as a period of time when an 
entrepreneur is able to raise its issue on the formal agenda and most of the time its 
solution. Policy windows are short and infrequent. However, some are predictable like 
annual budgets, and some remain unpredictable. Kingdon explains that a change in 
administration is the most obvious policy window, when new decision-makers are 
considering a new agenda. 
 
3.5. Agenda-Building Models 
Nelson (Nelson, 1984) analyzes agenda setting as hypotheses developed by school of 
thoughts rather than theories, the hypotheses being focused on a specific item of the 
process. She identifies three main streams: the organization approach, the issue career 
and cycle, and the economic growth. 
 
3.5.1. Economics Approaches 
The economics approaches rely on studies of public spending at a macroscopic level. 
Nelson (Nelson, 1984) explains that public choice theorists emphasize on the expansion 
of the government budget through majoritarian vote with logrolling. These approaches do 
not consider how particular issues reach the government agenda; therefore they will not 
be further expanded. 
 
3.5.2. Organizational Approach 
The organizational approach focuses on the decision-making process at the level of the 
political official. Indeed, Nelson (Nelson, 1984) describes the four steps in which the 
decision-maker agenda is set:  
• Issue Recognition: an issue is revealed and considered for a potential government 
action 
• Issue Adoption: the decision-maker chooses to act or not 
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• Setting Priorities: the decision-maker ranks his new issue on the top of the 
agenda 
• Issue Maintenance: the decision-maker pressures the governing body in order to 
implement a solution, may it be for the first time or periodically when a 
maintenance of the issue is needed 
 
3.5.3. Issue Career 
The issue career, as Nelson (Nelson, 1984) describes it, relies mainly on the work of 
Cobb, Ross and Ross (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1977). Indeed, they define three models for 
agenda setting, based on the nature of the initiator of the process. The first one, the 
outside initiative model, describes how a group, isolated from the decision-makers, 
manages to put an issue on the formal agenda. In the second one, the mobilization 
model, the decision-maker himself initiates the issue, but need to reach the public agenda 
for implementation. Eventually, the inside access model takes into account the will of a 
group with privileged access to the decision-makers in setting its issue on the formal 
agenda. 
The three models are summarized on the table through five steps: 
• Initiation 
• Specification 
• Expansion 
• Strategies (of expansion) 
• Entrance 
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 Outside Initiative Mobilization Inside Access 
Definition 
A non-governmental group initiates 
the issue that reaches first the public 
agenda, then the formal agenda. 
Political leaders initiate the issue. 
Although being on the formal agenda, 
it is not on a public agenda and 
leaders need to gather constituency 
for the implementation. 
The issue is bore by a group with 
relatively easy access to the decision-
makers. The initiator seeks to reach 
the formal agenda by pressuring the 
decision-makers without reaching the 
public agenda. 
Initiation 
A group, which is not related to the 
decision-maker, and thus has little 
access to the formal agenda, 
formulates the issue. 
The issue is set on the formal agenda 
by the current government when it 
defines the issue as a priority, being 
sure that action will be taken. 
Specification 
The initiator group formulates its 
issue into demands. The problem can 
be specified in several demands that 
answer the concern of the initial 
group. 
The entrepreneur specifies his 
concerns in order to clarify his will 
towards the public. 
The initiation and the specification 
are done at the same time. The group 
not only address an issue to the 
decision-maker, but it also submits 
concrete solutions to scope the issue. 
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 Outside Initiative Mobilization Inside Access 
Expansion 
To reach the decision-maker, the 
initiator group expands its issue to 
others groups, most of the time in 
linking it to other existing issues. 
Two different groups are concerned: 
• Identification groups, the first 
to be mobilized because they 
own strong interests in the 
issue 
• Attention groups, less 
involved directly by the issue, 
but concerned in general by 
public policies. Likely to 
spread the issue to the 
attentive public. 
The entrepreneur needs to gather 
support in the public in order to 
achieve implementation. Expansion 
to other groups is therefore crucial. 
Gathering support must start first by 
creating a debate among the key 
actors. Attentive public will rapidly 
be involved; however, the initiator 
must manage the response of 
opposition groups. 
Not seeking to reach the public 
agenda, the initial group pays 
attention to control the expansion to a 
limited number of groups, including 
the identification group and some 
attentive groups. The goal is to create 
enough pressure so that the decision-
makers consider the issue as well as 
the proposed policy. However, the 
expansion must not draw the attention 
of opposition groups and other groups 
that may divert the policy. 
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 Outside Initiative Mobilization Inside Access 
Strategies 
There is competition with other issues 
and with opposition forces. Thus, the 
issue can be aimed at the mass public 
directly or can be channeled through 
interest groups. A strategy could be to 
link the issue with a rallying symbol 
in the society 
Strategies depend mainly on the issue 
itself and the resources from the 
initial group. 
Strategies are also depending here on 
the issue itself as well as the 
resources and maneuverability of the 
initiator. A common strategy is to 
underline a change from the past, 
pointing out the movement. 
Expansion strategies are essentially 
based on negotiations among the 
different groups in order to reach a 
consensus, supporting the issue. 
Entrance 
Entrance is the movement from the 
public agenda to the formal agenda. It 
could be achieved through: 
• Institutional sanctions  
• Direct access 
• Negotiations with interests 
groups 
First, the entrance is the movement 
from the formal agenda to the public 
agenda. On the other hand, it is also a 
movement to the local formal agenda, 
where the issue will be implemented. 
Entrance is defined by the issue 
attaining the formal agenda. It could 
be achieved through negotiations but 
rarely with external factors. 
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Initiator and Policy Entrepreneur 
There could be some confusion in what Cobb, Ross and Ross (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 
1977) call the initiator and the policy entrepreneur defined by Kingdon (Kingdon, 1995). 
The role of the initiator is really limited to arise the issue from the multitude of society's 
problems. The policy entrepreneur role is to support the issue. It often happens (specially 
in the mobilization model) that the same person plays the two roles, hence the confusion. 
 
Triggers, Policy Windows and Focusing Events 
There could also be some confusion over the notions of trigger, policy window and 
focusing event. The main difference between the three notions is that they appear at 
different stages of the process. The trigger is related to the issue and the initiator; it 
basically reveals the issue to the initiator. On the other hand, focusing event are more 
associated with the issue emergence in people's minds. Eventually, the major difference 
between a focusing event and a policy window is that policy windows are specifically 
oriented to the formal agenda and closely related to the entrepreneur. Although, decision-
makers could peruse a problem, they may not consider it for action.  
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Chapter 4:  Problems and Methodology 
 
4.1. Problems: Car drivers: a major stakeholder  
Transportation is not a major public concern. Indeed, it is rarely on the top of the public 
agenda like education or health. Nevertheless, it is a major component of our daily lives: 
going to work, moving goods, access to leisure… In the context of growing travel 
demand, the private cars have become more and more present in the way of achieving 
such mobility and the automobile is now the dominant mode of transportation in the vast 
majority of metropolitan areas around the world. This has resulted in growing saturation 
levels of congestion that impact negatively on both the automobiles and the surface 
transit. Policy-makers are generally unwilling to confront this very critical part of our 
lives, convinced that they could jeopardize their political careers by even questioning the 
sustainability of auto-dependency. 
 
4.2. Hypotheses 
4.2.1. Where The Literature Leaves Us 
The rational and incremental models are descriptive; indeed they try to understand the 
acts of decision-makers. Nevertheless, they have limited explanation power to analyze 
policy-making process, as it involved a multitude of actors other than the decision-makers 
themselves. On the other hand, the agenda-building literature offers an alternative to 
consider the process as a whole by describing the different stages and relationships.  
Agenda-building approach remains very generalist on describing public policy-making. 
Kingdon (Kingdon, 1995) is the only one to look at transportation policy-making, though 
at a federal level. Nevertheless, agenda-building models allow us to consider two 
approaches: the organizational approach, focused on the political officials' point of 
view and the issue career, focused on the issue itself. The issue career can be described 
using three models of agenda-setting. We have also gained some elements to identify 
these three models through the methodology developed by Cobb, Ross and Ross (Cobb, 
Ross and Ross, 1977).  
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Moreover, they enounce three hypotheses on the predominance of each model that can 
help us to formulate some hypotheses: 
1. "The more egalitarian a society, the more likely that the outside initiative pattern 
will predominate" 
2. "The greater the concentration of wealth and status in a society, the more likely 
the inside initiative pattern will predominate" 
3. "The more hierarchical a society, the more likely the mobilization pattern will 
predominate" 
 
4.2.2. Hypotheses 
We have seen that a large number of institutions are involved in the implementation of 
preferential treatment. Also confronting car drivers remains a controversial aspect for 
political officials. According to Cobb, Ross and Ross (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1977) 
hypotheses suggest that the mobilization will predominate because of the number of 
interests. In consequence, we want to test the following hypotheses:  
1. The implementation will rise an important opposition from the public and 
the stakeholders 
2. A policy entrepreneur in the decision-making body is necessary and 
sufficient to implement preferential treatment 
3. There would be a mobilization scheme (that might follow other models) 
in the public policy-making process to achieve the preferential treatment 
implementation 
4. Inside access model, alone, cannot have significant impacts on 
implementations 
5. Outside initiative model remains rare 
6. Transportation authorities' roles are limited to providing their planning 
and technical expertise during the process 
 
  Page 45/120 
4.3. Methodology 
4.3.1. The Case Studies 
To test the hypothesis, we will look at case studies of cities that have implemented 
preferential treatment. General information on the 11 cities are presented in table 2. 
 
City Population Area (km2) 
Strasbourg 451,000 306 
Lyon 1,152,000 486 
London 7,007,000 1,579 
Manchester 2,578,000 1,272 
Dublin 953,000 593 
Honolulu 718,000 3,987 
Portland 529,121 348 
Ottawa 972,000 323 
Zurich 785,000 625 
Curitiba 1,600,000 432 
Bogotá 5,569,000 1,730 
Table 2: Cities' Population and Area 
• Curitiba, Ottawa, Portland and Zurich have been selected, as they have 
implemented their policies quite early and are often seen as references in terms of 
preferential treatment.  
• Strasbourg and Lyon are interesting cases because they were implemented along 
the elaboration of a national French policy, which ultimately built a framework 
for the generalization of preferential treatment.  
• London and Manchester have been able to implement their systems using local 
dynamism, as central governments in the UK were quite inexistent.  
• Dublin is offering an insight about the involvements of the Irish government as 
well as European funds in order to define broad urban policies.  
• Eventually, Honolulu, which is the only city that has not yet physically 
implemented preferential treatment but has gone through all the policy process, 
stands for a typical America middle-size city with growing congestion and very 
poor public transportation. 
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4.3.2. The Agenda-Building Framework 
The analysis of each case study will be conducted using the agenda-building models. We 
will try to identify three phases that are described in figure 14: 
1. The initial model 
2. The mobilization model 
3. The organization approach 
In phase one, we want to find out what is the model that predominates in the agenda 
setting. We will test the central hypothesis – a policy entrepreneur in the decision-making 
sphere is necessary and sufficient to implement preferential treatment – twice in the 
initial model: first at the initiation then at the expansion level. The validation of our 
hypothesis will lead to phase two where we analyze the mobilization model. In phases 
one and two, we will document the different steps (initiation, specification, expansions, 
strategies, entrances) suggested by the issue career model. In case of refutation of the 
main hypothesis, we will consider that only one model predominated and we will try to 
analyze the reasons that allow an exclusive inside access or outside initiative model. 
Eventually, the phase three (following an eventual phase two) will be focused on the 
entrepreneur decision-maker.  
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Figure 14: Methodology Scheme 
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4.3.3. Data Collections 
Data for the case studies have been collected from different sources.  
1. General information on the network infrastructures is mainly coming from Jane's 
Database and from UITP's statistics. 
2. Some WebPages (personal, authorities…) lists and describes briefly some events, 
sometimes providing maps. Also, public transportation papers give such overviews. 
3. For cities that had an early implementation, the literature gives details on the 
decision-making processes. (Curitiba, Ottawa, Zurich) 
4. For all the cities, case studies databases, such as ELTIS (European Local Transport 
Information Service), come back on the main events during the process. Also, 
documents from UITP (working papers, congress reports) also provide good 
references on the processes. 
5. Eventually, the more accurate source of information has been the interviews of people 
directly involved in the decision-making process. 
 
4.3.4. Interviews 
The interviews represent the backbone of the case studies' chapters. The people 
interviewed and their position are described in the following table (table 3): 
City Person Interviewed Position 
Strasbourg Marc Pesenti Head of Mobility Department, Communauté 
Urbaine de Strasbourg 
Lyon Bruno Faivre-d'Arcier Professor, Université Lyon II – Laboratoire 
d'Economie des Transports 
London Kevin Gardner Head of the Bus Priority Unit, TfL 
Manchester Roger Hall 
Tony Young 
Former Deputy Director General, GMPTE 
Former Senior Planner, GMPTE 
Dublin Derry O'Learry 
John Henry 
Strategic Planning Manager, Dublin Bus 
Director – Chief Executive, DTO 
Honolulu Paul Stefens Public Transit Division Chief, 
Department of Transportation Services 
Portland Joe Fox Former Civil Engineering Manager, Tri-Met 
Ottawa John Bonsall Former Director of Transportation Planning, 
RMOC 
Zurich None 
Curitiba None 
Bogotá None 
Table 3: Summary of the people interviewed 
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Finding the right person to interview mainly occurred through personal and/or 
professional networking. Having spent the summer 2002 interning at the UITP allowed us 
to identify sources for the case studies in most of the cities. Also, interviewees have been 
kind enough to not only provide new contacts but also reorientate us to other sources for 
more specific details. 
After giving a brief description of the research and of the agenda-building models, the 
interviews were based on the following set of questions: 
• Existence of previous plans or/and attempts to deal with public transportation 
issues 
• Identification of the initiation stage:  
  Who was the initiator? 
  What were the triggers? 
• The initiator relations with decision-makers, transportation authorities and the 
public 
• The position of the initiator towards the issue:  
  Were solutions already envisioned?  
  Was the project still considering alternatives? 
• Expansion of the problem to the other actors:  
  What were the transportation authority's reactions? 
  How the decision-makers felt about the process? 
• How the issue was expanded 
  Were there consultations led? 
  How the transportation authority got involved? 
  How the initiator got access to the formal agenda? 
• Public interests groups: 
  Was there any opposition? 
  How was it overcome? 
• The presence of a policy entrepreneur among the decision-makers: 
  Who and what was his influence? 
  At what stage did his support become crucial? 
• Position of the person interviewed 
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Chapter 5:  Mobilization Model: Case Studies 
 
5.1. Strasbourg, France 
5.1.1. Preferential Treatment Description and Historic 
 
Map 1: Strasbourg, France14 
 
 Length Miscellaneous 
Bus 288 km 7 km on priority right-of-way 
Tramway 22.6 km 4 lines in service running on 2 right-of-
ways 
Table 4: Strasbourg's Preferential Treatment 15 
Public transportation in Strasbourg involves the "Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg" or 
the Strasbourg Metropolitan Authority (CUS) and the "Compagnie des Transports 
Strasbourgeois" (CTS), the operator. CUS, created in 1969, gathers under its jurisdiction 
27 municipalities and is in charge of the planning and policy making. 
                                               
14
 Source: Compagnie des Transports Strasbourgeois (2000) 
15
 Source: Jane's Urban Transport System 2002-2003 
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In 1994, the first line (10 km of tramway) was put into service, followed in 2000 by 12.6 
km of the second line. 
 
5.1.2. Initial Model 
Initiation 
The first model started in the 70's after the first Oil Crisis when public powers looked at 
public transportation to limit the oil dependency. In 1974, the CUS approved the principle 
of developing a priority route networks. 
 
Specification 
In 1976, the CUS approved the draft plans of a first tramway line. At this time, the city 
opted for preferential treatment. But it was only in 1983 that plans for a tramway system 
were submitted. Nevertheless, in 1985, studies were ordered to compare the tramway and 
the underground light rail. The CUS decision-makers traveled in different cities 
comparing systems, particularly Nantes that had already implemented the tramway and 
Lille that had chosen an underground light rail16 technology called "Véhicule 
Automatique Léger"(VAL). The same year, the previous process collapsed, as the 
tramway technology was rejected in favor of an underground light rail similar to the 
VAL. From 1985 to 1989, surveys and studies were led to establish detailed plans for the 
light rail. We can see that the initial model is a mobilization model but with very little 
support as there was no policy entrepreneur. 
 
5.1.3. Mobilization Model 
Initiation 
Catherine Trauttman, who would later be the policy entrepreneur, got elected in 1989. 
During the municipal campaign of 1989, transportation issues reached back the public 
agenda and Trauttman's team campaigned for the tramway, arguing that the cost and the 
civil work's impacts would be lower. 
 
                                               
16
 In this case, Lille chose a subway but with lower capacity than conventional heavy rail technology (thus 
the name light rail). It should not be considered as preferential treatment as it is not at-grade. 
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Specification 
The newly elected entrepreneur ordered new studies on the tramway in June 1989, 
dropping for good the light rail. In November of the same year, the CUS approved the 
plans of the first line. The specification phase occurred during the municipal campaign 
when Trauttman defended the tramway solution as a way not only to tackle the growing 
congestion but also to reshape the urban fabric. 
 
Expansion and Strategies 
The tramway project encountered strong opposition from two interest groups: the 
automobilist lobby and the retailers. A public debate was organized in the city and Holec 
(Holec, 1998) describes the consultation process whose main goal was to explain the 
project to the communities and the neighborhoods in order to limit opposition. Also CTS 
organized more than 70 meetings on the bus network restructuring. These meetings 
gathered customers association, CTS managers and elected officials. The opposition was 
not completely removed; nevertheless the public globally accepted the project. 
 
Entrance 
Following the consultation process, the project went on without major delays, as it must 
be remembered that it was legitimized by the 1989 elections. In 1992, the traffic crossing 
the city center was stopped for the public works and never re-allowed. Following the 
opening of the first line, the main opposition groups, the retailers, acknowledged the 
positive impacts for their business, supporting the expansion of the network. 
 
5.1.4. Organizational Approach 
Issue Recognition and Adoption 
It is not absolutely clear why Catherine Trauttman rejected the light rail, putting the 
tramway back on the table. It seems that during the visits in other cities, the example of 
Nantes convinced Trauttman to go for preferential treatment in addition to a favorable 
cost/benefit analysis. 
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Setting Priorities 
Transportation issues were a major theme of the municipal campaign of 1989. Thus, the 
governing team established preferential treatment as a priority in their tenure. The 
opening of the first line in November 1994, five months before the next elections 
appeared as mandate's outcome. 
 
Issue Maintenance 
The second line opened during the second tenure in 2000 but Trauttman also ensured that 
the potential next mayor (to be elected in 2001) would keep on developing the network. 
Further studies were ordered by the administration and a third line scheduled in 2006. 
 
5.2. Lyon, France 
5.2.1. Preferential Treatment Description and Historic 
 
 
Map 2: Lyon, France17 
 
                                               
17
 Source: SYTRAL, www.isis.tm.fr  
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 Length Miscellaneous 
Bus 1 132 km 
Trolleybus 54 km Exclusive right-of-way: 77.4 km 
Tramway 18.7 km18 In service since January 2001 
Metro 27.5 km 4 lines and a funicular 
Table 5: Lyon's Preferential Treatment 19 
 
In addition to four levels of government in the general decision-making process in France 
– the State, the Region, the Department and the Cities – the COURLY (COmmunauté 
URbaine de LYon) creates a new level of power between the Department and the Cities. 
The COURLY is legally a community of cities in charge of the metropolitan area. 
However, its influence had been limited due to the political conflicts in which cities 
defended their own interests and therefore blocked the entire dialogue process. Another 
stakeholder in Lyon is the SYTRAL (SYndicat de TRansports de l'Agglomération 
Lyonnaise), the transportation authority. The peculiarity of this transportation authority is 
that it is composed by elected officials (from the COURLY) and by technocrats (from 
technical departments of the State and the Industry). 
 
5.2.2. 1990: The Failure of the Inside access model 
Initiation and Specification 
In the 80's, following the LOTI act, Lyon started its PDU by a planning exercise in order 
to tackle the growing traffic problem. The process rapidly collapsed because the different 
cities were trying to attract the state investments without building any coherency at the 
metropolitan level. Moreover, the State abandoned its financial support. 
In 1989, under the leadership of the mayor Michel Noir, the transportation issues came 
back on the politic agenda. In 1990, the COURLY adopted a report elaborated by its 
technical department, giving support to a greater space for public transportation in the 
city. The COURLY also dedicated a large amount of money for the transportation sector 
(around a billion euros). At the same time, SYTRAL adopted the principle of 
intermediary network "Hippocampe" based on tramway technology.  
                                               
18
 Source: L'état des TCSP en service en mars 2001, GART 
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Expansion and Strategies 
The COURLY reacted negatively to the proposition, arguing on the integration in the 
urban setting and refusing to decrease the road capacity. Furthermore, Noir wanted to 
replace Lyon in a European context and pushed for the creation of two additional subway 
lines. Jouve and Purenne (Jouve and Purenne, 2000) describe how Noir imposed the 
subway solution to the detriment of the tramway project developed by the SYTRAL. In 
this case the transportation policy entrepreneur Noir happened to be not supporting 
preferential treatment and the project never reached the formal agenda. 
 
5.2.3. 1995: The Mobilization Model 
Initiation 
After the first failure, SYTRAL kept its plans on the concept of intermediary networks 
but never succeed to restart the process. In 1995, a new team got elected with Raymond 
Barre as mayor of Lyon and president of the COURLY. Also the composition of the 
COURLY assembly became more coherent. Christian Philip, first deputy of Barre, got in 
charge of the SYTRAL with the objective to redefine Lyon's transportation policy. The 
new policy entrepreneur Philip entrusted the Plan de Déplacement Urbain (PDU) or 
Urban Mobility Plan (cf. paragraph 8.5.1) conception to SYTRAL the same year. At this 
point, we can assert that the initial inside access model was taken over by a mobilization 
model, led by Philip. Indeed, the second attempt was still based on the SYTRAL work 
and re-initiated by Philip.  
 
Specification 
In order to elaborate the PDU, SYTRAL consulted different actors of the community, 
elected officials and technical services. Indeed, a broad consultation was led through the 
communities and neighborhoods. Moreover, work groups were set to make a diagnostic 
of the city. Three aspects were evaluated: 
• Public transportation and traffic 
• Priority to Transit 
                                                                                                                                            
19
 Source: Jane's Urban Transport System 2002-2003 
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• Environment and non-motorized modes 
The main PDU objectives were the following: 
• Capacity freezing of penetrating axes, capacity decreasing of transversal axes 
• Creation of plans of 30-km/h areas (traffic calming) in the next decade 
• Public transportation reorganization on the main axes in order to increase level-of-
service and the supply 
Moreover, the PDU was setting quantified modal shares goals, described in table . 
 
Reference Situation 
1995 Business as Usual PDU Objectives 
Percentage of Public 
Transportation 20.6% - 22.5% in 2005 
Auto Modal Share of 
Motorized Trips 77% 80% 74% in 2007 
Table 6: PDU Objectives in terms of modal share 20 
 
Expansion and Strategies 
Funding was the main argument in the expansion and strategies phases. As the PDU was 
being developed, different actors expressed their participation conditions. The 
Department expressed its opposition to further investments in subways, after costs 
overran during the implementation of the last two lines of subways. At the same time, the 
State fixed its participation through the Idrac Act: 15% for subway and 40% for light rail. 
It appeared that the intermediary network would gather a broader consensus among the 
actors. In 1996, the Loi sur l'Air (Clean Air Act) set the relations between the different 
actors. As Lyon was already complying with the LOTI and benefiting from the State 
support, the Clean Air Act removed the State financial participation and hurt more the 
process by removing a major financial support. 
Philip, supported by a political consensus, pushed to give transit full priority, relying on 
intermediary systems. A contract was established between the different actors and the 
technological choice was set to LRT. In October 1997, the PDU was approved, setting a 
network of 12 LRT lines. 
 
                                               
20
 Source: Suivi National des PDU, Comité GART, CERTU de suivi des PDU 
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Entrance 
Philip pushed for fast implementation of 2 lines in 2 years. Indeed, the next city elections 
were in 2001 and the transportation policy was one of the campaign themes for Philip, a 
potential successor of Barre. Although one of the lines was consensual, the second was 
very controversial and the project had to accommodate the different political interests. As 
a result, the commercial speed of the line was considerably reduced. There were no real 
opposition to the process, except retailers who were worried about the consequences of 
public works and the limitation of parking space. The PDU was elaborated on discussions 
with the neighborhoods, limiting the NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) feelings. 
Eventually the first two lines were opened in January 2001. Even though, the 
implementation was successful, the population was a little disappointed by the LRT, as 
they were expecting a capacity and a speed of a heavy rail.  
 
5.2.4. Organizational Approach 
Issue Recognition and Adoption 
Elected officials had acknowledged the traffic problem in Lyon since the 80's. The 
previous attempt from SYTRAL proved the influence of the technocrats in the decision-
making process. It is likely that Philip got involved earlier than 1995, as he got involved 
in transportation themes more generally. However, it remains unclear whether his choices 
were politically motivated (achievability in the tenure). 
 
Setting Priorities 
Philip revived the process as soon as the city council nominated him in charge of 
transportation. His entrepreneurship was not really as an advocate of preferential 
treatment but as a supporter of the initiator, the technocrats. Giving the elaboration of the 
PDU to the authority that expressed the need of intermediary networks appeared as a 
political support. Philip also relied on the PDU – that was not mandatory before 1996 – to 
gather the consensus he needed. 
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Issue Maintenance 
Although the PDU offered a convenient way to involve the different stakeholders, 
Christian Philip had to make sure that the process did not slow down. Indeed, Jouve and 
Purenne (Jouve and Purenne, 2000) write that Philip, a potential successor of Raymond 
Barre, was bidding on the city's transportation policy as an election program. The city 
election in 2001 appeared as a deadline to Philip project: 2 lines in 2 years. 
 
5.3. Curitiba, Brazil 
5.3.1. Preferential Treatment Description and Historic 
 
Map 3: Curitiba, Brazil21 
 
                                               
21
 Source: IPPPUC 
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 Length Miscellaneous 
Bus 1 271 km Reserved Corridors: 53.7 km Feeders: 294 km 
Table 7: Curitiba's Preferential Treatment22 
 
Capital city of the State of Parana, Curitiba has incrementally built its transit system over 
the last 30 years. In 1974, the first 20 kilometers of bus exclusive lanes were 
implemented and rapidly grew. In 1979, the concept of Integrated Transit Network was 
developed and the radial transit system was structured and reinforced by interdistrict 
lines. In the 80's, the system reached its capacity. First, the city upgraded its system by 
putting into service bi-articulated buses and tube stations (Picture 5), then implemented in 
1991 the Direct Line service (express service buses). The city was designed on the 
"Trinary Road System" (Picture 6):  
• The central artery are dedicated to public transportation (red on picture 6) 
• Two right-of-ways next the central artery are dedicated to cars (red on picture 6) 
• A block away, a one-way street is dedicated to direct line service (blue and green 
on picture 6). 
 
Picture 5: Bus at a Tube Station23 
 
Picture 6: Trinary Road System24 
 
                                               
22
 Source: Jane's Urban Transport System 2002-2003 
23
 Source: IPPUC Instituto de Planejamento Urbano de Curitiba, www.ippuc.org.br  
24
 Ibid  
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5.3.2. Initial Model 
Initiation and Specification 
In 1943, the Agache plan, the first plan establishing Curitiba's transportation priorities, 
pointed out the problem raised by motorization growth. Indeed, it stipulated the necessity 
to accommodate the future explosion of the automobile market and it suggested the 
creation of arterial highways in order to accommodate the future traffic. Right-of-ways 
were bought by the city but the works never started and the plans remains on the paper 
due to a lack of resources. 
In 1965, the "Plano Diretor de Curitiba" or Curitiba Master Plan was created to tackle the 
traffic problems. However, it adopted the completely opposite solution of the Agache 
plan: building the city around the transportation network through the strict control of the 
urban development along designated corridors. The city would grow linearly, not as the 
common radial model. The "Instituto de Planejamento Urbano de Curitiba" (IPPUC) was 
created to develop the Master Plan. 
 
Expansion and Strategies 
Although it has been exhaustively developed. The Master Plan was not implemented by 
decision-makers and stayed on the shelves until 1971. 
 
5.3.3. Mobilization Model 
Expansion and Strategies 
From 1965 to 1969, Jaime Lerner, a civil engineer who studied architecture and planning 
in France, joined the IPPUC team. In 1971, Lerner was elected/appointed at the head of 
the city. One of his first decisions was to transfer powers to the IPPUC to start the 
implementation of the Master Plan. At this point, Lerner launched the implementation 
with strong commitments, describing it as an emergency or a war against cars. The aims 
were clear: 
• Control the urban growth 
• Integrate urban functions 
• Give full priority to transit 
• Limit traffic and pollution 
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He imposed his vision in order to build the transit system: "Fast and cheap are still the 
best solutions for Curitiba". Thanks to the fast implementation and the success of 
transportation system, Lerner insured the continuity of the policy choice and that the next 
elected officials would follow the movement, as legislation forbad a mayor to rerun. 
However, Lerner came back to power at several occasions, improving and developing the 
system (mayor from 1979-1983, 1989-1993 and governor from 1995-1999). 
 
Entrance 
In order to understand the scope of Lerner leadership, we must describe briefly the 
Brazilian situation. Indeed, the country was not governed democratically at the national 
level with the military coup in 1964 that confiscated the power from the civilians. There 
was at this time censorship and really poor political opposition. Nevertheless, in 1967 the 
current constitution was adopted and the power was returned to the civilians in 1985. 
Lerner really took advantage of this lack of opposition. At this time, the main interest 
group opposed to the process was the car drivers. Cervero (Cervero, 1998a) explains in 
more details how Lerner imposed his policy (i.e. destructing roads and creating instead 
pedestrian-friendly areas).  
 
5.3.4. Organizational Approach 
Issue Recognition and Adoption 
Looking at decision-maker's point of view, it is likely that Lerner, thanks to his 
background, got involved before he joined the IPPUC. Having personally participated in 
the planning of the system, Lerner adopted the issue during his time at the IPPUC. 
 
Setting Priorities 
We have seen that Lerner gave to the IPPUC the powers to implement the plan, thus 
giving high priority to transportation policy as soon as he got nominated. Setting 
priorities was also an issue because of the impossibility for the mayor to be re-elected 
consecutively.  
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Issue Maintenance 
The policy entrepreneur, Lerner avoided any delays in the implementation opting for 
cheap and technologically feasible projects: buses were chosen because of the flexibility 
its offers and limited capital investments. When the system got in place, we can say that 
Curitiba became victim of its success. The capacity had to be increased several times and 
new services (express routes) were introduced to scope the growing demand. The 
maintenance was really an issue before the implementation. 
 
5.4. Bogotá, Colombia 
5.4.1. Preferential Treatment Description and Historic 
 
Map 4: Transmilenio in Bogotá, Colombia25 
 
 Length Miscellaneous 
Bus 35.6 km Only the Bus Exclusive Lanes 
Table 8: Bogotá's Preferential Treatment 26 
In December 2000, Transmilenio, a Bus Rapid Transit, started operations in Bogotá. 
Initiated by Mayor Enrique Peñalosa at the beginning of its mandate in 1998, the city and 
private operators built and organized the transit system. Three sections have been 
completed in less than three years. The previous system, composed by bus private 
operators and small jitneys companies, has been integrated in the feeder system. 
 
                                               
25
 Source: www.transmilenio.gov.co 
26
 Source: Millennium database 
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5.4.2. The Subway Project 
Bogotá had discussed the construction of a transit system for a long time. Building a 
subway to provide heavy capacity transportation was already on the public agenda in the 
40's. Ardila (Ardila, 2002) described the more recent attempts to implement the subway 
solution. In 1980, a feasibility study was ordered and the transportation institutions were 
reformed to start the construction of the infrastructure but the political change during the 
following elections stopped the entire project due to the lack of strategies and planning of 
the previous administration. In 1986, the new government refocused on the subway 
option in ordering studies to a private consultant. However, the technical difficulties and 
the high cost pushed the city to renounce. At the same time, a group of engineers and 
planners studied the alternative implementation of a bus transit system, based on the ones 
developed at the same period in Quito (Ecuador) and Curitiba (Brazil) concluding to the 
financial and technical feasibility. The project did not draw much political attention, as 
leaders strongly believed in the metro. Later in 1990, another attempt from the city 
government failed because of the cost and the lack of resources. Eventually in 1994 the 
new mayor ordered a planning, always considering the subway solution. It failed once 
again: the delays prevented the implementation. 
 
5.4.3. Mobilization Model 
Initiation 
In 1998, Enrique Peñalosa Londoño was elected mayor of Bogotá. Although not holding 
a transportation background, Peñalosa had long been considering preferential treatment to 
scope traffic problems in the Colombian capital city. The following article, written by 
Peñalosa himself in 1985, is particularly relevant to understand his vision of public 
transportation. 
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How to reorganize transportation27 
10 millions Colombians find everyday a slow and inconvenient public transportation 
system. Nights and weekends, the transportation supply is completely inadequate, which 
seriously affect the quality of life. In the poor and distant neighborhoods, there are no 
buses. We suggest here that it is possible to improve radically the quality if urban 
transportation in Colombia, based on a complete reorganization of the current 
transportation system, with major investments projects.[…] 
The subway is not the solution. 
A transportation expert would say: "Take this city, with given transportation flows and 
given number miles. Then, we suggest an optimal transportation system. But, we do not 
take into account the streets. They are for the cars." 
Within this frame, it is necessary in terms of elevated monorails, subways, etc. However, 
if we give priority of the street to transit then it is possible to design an excellent system 
of public transportation, based fundamentally on buses and trolleybuses and possibly on 
at-grade trains […] Today, public transportation is slow for the following reasons: 
1. the buses struggle for the passengers, due to the superposition of routes in the 
same right-of-ways, 
2. the autos obstruct the bus flow 
3. there are a excessive number of intersections in the principal streets. 
The system we suggest 
More than the massive investments, the solution to transportation problem requires an 
administrative reorganization and most of all a political decision. The prerequisite for 
the reorganization is the creation of a unique Transportation Authority (ETU) at the city 
level, in charge of fixing and contracting the routes, determining the type of equipments 
to be used, supervising the existing public transportation entities, orienting the traffic 
organization and the investments in road infrastructures.[…] 
The radical solution of public transportation must be in the next government program. It 
is technically and financially possible to offer a good service at a low cost. It requires 
only giving to public transportation the priority it deserves, as a mechanism to improve 
quality of life, and the political decision to reach the necessary reforms. 
 
Specification 
During the campaign, Peñalosa insisted on the subway alternative. However, right after 
his election, he created two offices in charge of planning the potential subway 
construction or the potential bus system. Rapidly, the first office concluded that the 
subway was not feasible for financial reasons. Henceforth, the administration focused on 
the bus alternative by setting a planning team and starting the design the system. Peñalosa 
also set a task force of 12 persons to study in more depth the BRT options. 
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 Source: Cómo reorganizar el transporte, El Espectador, Enrique Peñalosa Londoño 06/02/85 
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Expansion and Strategies 
During the expansion phase, the policy entrepreneur had to deal with two interests 
groups: the automobile drivers and the "colectivos" operators. Car drivers were an 
influent interest group in terms of transportation policy. Unhappy to see the roads being 
dedicated to public transportation, they tried unsuccessfully to impeach Peñalosa. As an 
expansion strategy, the mayor organized a referendum to establish his authority. Two 
propositions were submitted to the "Bogotanos".  
 
Proposition 1: Annual Car Free Day 
The institution of an annual Car Free Day for the city, after the experience of February 
the 24th, 2001 
Proposition 2: Pico y Placa - 2015 
Creation of a firm legal framework to support the phased elimination of all peak hour car 
traffic in the city, building in increments on the existing 'Pico y Placa' scheme and to be 
completed as of 2015. 
Figure 15: Referendum on Car Use28 
The mayor answered to the drivers' interest group that he would resign if the first 
proposition scored less than 60%. 
Annual Car Free Day Pico y Placa – 2015 
Yes 
No 
Blank ballots 
791,867 
329,597 
131,589 
63.20% 
26.30% 
10.50% 
Yes 
No 
Blank ballots 
521,106 
348,713 
146,855 
51.25% 
34.30% 
14.45% 
Table 9: Results from the Referendums29 
The referendum was definitely implemented to rally support for a policy that was 
threatening the interests of a minority. The second source of concerns was the colectivos. 
Bogotá had relied for a long time on jitney services as public transportation and 
colectivos operators felt threatened by a mass transit system. Peñalosa negotiated with 
them and ultimately convinced them to integrate the system as a feeder service. 
 
Entrance 
The entrance did not raise any major concerns as the mayor insured constituency for his 
project and contained the opposition groups. The financial aspect was also smooth as 
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 Source: Ecoplan, www.ecoplan.org  
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 Source: Ecoplan, www.ecoplan.org  
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Peñalosa enjoyed sufficient funds through the city budget and a tax plan, avoiding him 
the needs of foreign investments. 
 
5.4.4. Organizational Approach 
Issue Recognition and Adoption 
The previous article showed that the issue recognition was very early. Indeed, Peñalosa 
admitted the influence of the Curitiba and Quito in developing a solution for Bogotá. 
Peñalosa had long in mind the choice of the surface preferential treatment instead of the 
underground metropolitan. However, he did base his election campaign on the metro 
alternative. Some argue that it was mainly for political tactic, knowing the controversy 
around preferential treatment. 
 
Setting Priorities 
During his tenure, the mayor launched a broad program of urban renewal, including 
public and green spaces, transit system and land use policy. The implementation of 
Transmilenio was one of the highest priority because it was on the top of the public 
agenda. Indeed, most of the congestion in Bogotá was the results of the colectivos, 
running quite chaotically. The previous failures of the metro projects, in contrast with the 
opening of the metro of Medellin in 1995, started to pressure the decision-makers. 
 
Issue Maintenance 
Issue maintenance was also an issue because mayors cannot seek two consecutive terms. 
Thus, Peñalosa had only four years to implement its vision and to convince the 
population. Once the system was scheduled to open within Peñalosa's tenure, the 
expansion of the system (only 3 trunks were put into service in 2000) was an issue. The 
second proposition of the referendum allowed him to address the issue. The results 
insured that the following mayor could not reject or postpone the development of the 
network. 
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Figure 16: The Different Stage of Transmilenio30 
 
As seen in figure 16, many other sections are already planned to provide an integrate and 
redundant system to the city by the year 2016. 
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Chapter 6:  Inside Access Models: Case Studies 
 
6.1.  London, United Kingdom 
6.1.1. Preferential Treatment Description and Historic 
 
Map 5: London, United Kingdom31 
 
 Length Miscellaneous 
Bus Lanes 156 km 499 traffic priority introduced since 1982 
Table 10: London's Preferential Treatment 32 
The implementation of preferential treatment in London followed two phases 
corresponding to two agenda-building models. From 1973 to 1986, the mobilization 
model allowed the introduction of 229 bus lanes. Then from 1994 to nowadays, 432 bus 
lanes were introduced following the inside access model (Figure 17). 
                                               
31
 Source: 2001 Morning Peak Road Network, Bus Lane, Greater London, Area, Transport for London 
32
 Source: Quality Bus Corridors – A Tool For Better Attractiveness, Kevin Gardner, International 
Conference - Maastricht, 7-9 February 2001, «Innovation in Road Public Transport», UITP 
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Figure 17: Bus Lane in London33 
 
6.1.2. Mobilization Model 1964-1986 
Initiation and Specification 
In the 1960's, the London Government set a gamut of measures to increase road capacity 
– mainly constructions of urban highways – under the pressure of the highway lobby. At 
this time there was a political split on the policies to tackle the growing congestion: the 
Labour Party supporting public transportation whereas the Conservative Party supporting 
the car alternative. Bus lanes started to be implemented in 1968, more as an 
experimentation. In 1973, the election of the Labour Party to the Greater London Council 
(GLC) shifted the attention to the public transportation. 
 
Expansion and Strategies 
In the early 1980's, the GLC published "Changing the Balance" report, where it stated its 
will to favor cheap and efficient public transportation for the next five years. The first 
phase of bus lane implementations had been the generalization of the experimentation 
started in 1968 under the political leadership of the GLC. As we said earlier, 229 bus 
lanes were introduced until 1986, with the implementation of traffic priority in 1982. 
Inside Access Model  
Mobilization Model 
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Unfortunately in 1986, the central government abolished the GLC and the preferential 
treatment policy decreased dramatically. Indeed, from 1986 to 1990 only 11 bus lanes 
were implemented. 
 
6.1.3. Inside Access Model 1992-… 
Initiation and Specification 
Following the abolition of the GLC, the transportation authorities were dismantled: the 
highways prerogatives were given to the London boroughs and a public transportation 
strategic body was set the London Transport (LT). In the late 1980's, the congestion put 
back transportation issues on the public agenda and LT published the "Green Route" 
report stating once again the benefit of preferential treatment.  
 
Expansion and Strategies 
In 1992, LT, in close co-operation with 11 boroughs, started bus lane demonstration 
projects in three corridors (South and West London, Uxbridge Road, North Docklands), 
an equivalent of 89 kilometers of bus exclusive right-of-way.  
 
Entrance 
The success of the demonstration projects (because it drastically improved running time 
and schedule adherence) led the LT to launch the London Bus Priority Network (LBPN) 
in 1994. Afterwards in 1996, the 33 boroughs of London participated in allowing the 
implementation of preferential treatment on 45 km (over 869 km of the network, 313 bus 
lanes). Following the election of the Labour Party at the National Government, a White 
Paper on UK transportation was published "A New Deal for Transport: Better for 
Everyone". It particularly focused on the necessity to favor bus priority and gave support 
to local initiatives. The LBPN initiative was extended to 22 km (over 505 km) of Priority 
Route Network (PRN), roads owned by the central government. In 2000, following the 
reinstatement of a central government: the Greater London Authority (GLA), Transport 
for London was created as the transportation arm of the GLA, in charge of the bus 
network. The election of Ken Livingston as a mayor of London, after a campaign focused 
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on transportation issues, has since speeded the development of preferential treatment. 
Indeed, Livingston promised during his campaign to improve public transportation but 
not having the control of the Underground, he could only focus on the surface network to 
achieve his campaign program. 
 
6.2. Manchester, United Kingdom 
6.2.1. Preferential Treatment Description and Historic 
 
Map 6: Manchester, United Kingdom34 
 
 Length Miscellaneous 
LRT 36.6 km  
Table 11: Manchester's Preferential Treatment 35 
In Manchester, the GMPTE (Greater Manchester Passenger Transport Executive) is the 
main body in charge of public transportation. It is also associated to the PTA (Passenger 
Transport Authority), composed of elected officials responsible for the policy-making. 
The GMPTE was created in 1969 under the name of PTE Selnec, became the GMPTE in 
1974 and came under the trusteeship of the newly created PTA in 1986. 
                                               
34
 Source: Jane's Urban Transport System 2002-2003 
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 Source: UITP 
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6.2.2. Inside Access Model 
Initiation 
There was an extensive heavy rail network in Manchester, mainly at-grade, which shut 
down in the mid-1960. Based on Toronto experience, a study "Manchester Rapid Transit" 
was commissioned in 1966-67 to a private consultant. It recommended that the old 
network should be reconverted into a subway; however the project was too expensive for 
the city. In 1972, the "Selnec Transportation Study" executed by the highway authority 
looked at all forms of transportation possible – with the exception of LRT – for the city of 
Manchester. It recommended the upgrade of the current rail network with underground 
structures in the city center. PTE took part to the study reluctantly, but eventually 
accepted it as it was dealing to the whole Manchester area, whereas the Manchester Rapid 
Transit had focused only on the city of Manchester. Independently, the PTE issued a 
long-term planning report the same year suggesting for the first time the LRT option. In 
1973, the Selnec Transportation Study got the parliamentary power (the approval of the 
MP's) but the central government refused to fund the project, which was definitely 
abandoned. 
In 1974, the Greater Manchester Council (GMC) was created, replacing some 70 local 
authorities. Three years after, the conservatives won the elections, marking a total change 
in policy. Indeed, all the public transportation projects were stopped and the elected 
officials fought fiercely against any attempts to limit car use (like pedestrian areas). 
Nevertheless, in 1980, under the pressure of a business association, which convinced the 
politicians of the benefits of pedestrian areas, the GMC changed its policy. No measures 
were taken to balance the decrease of road capacity, but the congestion eased, convincing 
part of the public. On the other hand, an amateur group campaigned in 1975 for the 
implementation of the LRT, after publishing a report encouraging the Light Rail option. 
In 1981, the Labour Party came back to power, decided to tackle the transportation issue.  
 
Specification 
In 1982-1983 a joint study was commissioned to look at the economics of the different 
alternatives. The study suggested three options: 
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a. Heavy Rail 
b. Guided Bus system 
c. A LRT either exclusively at-grade or a mix of underground and at-grade 
Tony Young, at the time Principal Planning Officer at the GMPTE, was the one to push 
in favor of the LRT. He believed that LRT was the solution for Manchester, as it was 
much cheaper and quicker than the heavy rail. He also thought that the at-grade solution 
was not so controversial – as the pedestrian areas already convinced the public – and that 
the LRT would run on existing right-of-ways and on some bus lanes already implemented 
in the city center.  
 
Expansion and Strategies 
In 1983, the GMPTE organized a field trip for the councilors and the planners in 
Germany, France, Netherlands, Switzerland and the USA (San Diego) to evaluate the bus 
and the LRT option. At the same time, councilor Andrew Fender, Chairman of the 
Greater Manchester Committee (in charge of the overall strategic planning for the GMC) 
became more and more involved in supporting the LRT. Already convinced and 
enthusiastic about the LRT (Tony Young declared that in the early 1980's, Fender was 
spending most of his time with him at the GMPTE to work on the project). However, he 
could not turn the process into a mobilization model, but instead convinced his fellows to 
go for the LRT. In 1985, GMPTE and Fender organized a second field trip in Toronto, 
Calgary and Portland, but Fender's good understanding of the issue already convinced the 
other councilors. 
 
Entrance 
In 1984, a bill was deposed for the project in the city center (in 1985 for the old right-of-
ways) to the Parliament. The project went thought parliament committees for evaluation. 
Some interests groups objected the scheme in principle but mainly for property rights. 
The objections were withdrawn after the GMPTE reached an agreement to protect the 
property rights. The project was approved in 1988 by the Parliament. The process did not 
encounter fierce objections mainly because of the GMC initiative in mid-1970. Indeed, it 
set the Greater Manchester Transportation Consultative Committee gathering a wide 
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range of bodies related to transportation. Even though not mandatory, the GMPTE 
organized a parallel stakeholders consultation to the parliamentary procedure. During the 
consultation, automobilists associations gave their support for the project after talks with 
the highway department on traffic priorities. 
It is worth noting that in 1986, the Central Government abolished the GMC and the 
GMPTE continued the project with the PTA. 
In 1992, the first line was put into service and an extension was commissioned but under 
the Transport Work Act, giving more autonomy and avoiding the parliamentary 
procedure. 
 
6.3. Dublin, Eire 
6.3.1. Preferential Treatment Description and Historic 
 
Map 7: Dublin, Eire36 
 
 Length Miscellaneous 
Bus  
LRT (Planned) 
885 km 26.2 km on priority right-of-way, 9 QBC 
2 lines to be delivered in 2003, 4-5 to be implemented 
Table 12: Dublin's Preferential Treatment 37 
In the 1980's, Dublin authorities started a broad planning initiative that has resulted in the 
implementation of numbers of transportation policies. It includes the construction of a 
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LRT network and the implementation of Quality Bus Corridors (QBC). The QBC are 
measures to enhance the bus level-of-service through exclusive lanes, traffic priorities… 
 
6.3.2. Inside Access Model 
Initiation 
Since the 1970's, a lot of planning had been done in Dublin with very few 
implementations. With the perception that traffic was getting worse and that public 
transportation modal share was steadily declining, the Irish government set in 1988 the 
Dublin Transportation Review Group. For three months, the Group (composed of various 
government departments, local authorities and Coras Iompair Eirann) worked under the 
leadership of civil engineers. It recommended that a major study should be done in the 
greater area with a 20-year strategy and a 5-year implementation plan.  
 
Specification 
Hereafter, between 1990 and 1991, the Group gathered technical experts, agencies' 
representatives and individuals to carry the recommendations. It stated three objectives: 
• A 20-year multimodal strategy, 
• A 5-year Investment and Implementation Program (1994-1999), 
• On-going planning process. 
The philosophy of the Group then differed from previous planning exercise in focusing 
on the city rather than transportation: "What city should be built?" and "What 
transportation system would be appropriate?" A massive public consultation was 
launched through mass media, public meetings, workshops… 330 000 households were 
surveyed on what should be envisioned for Dublin. At this point, the population 
expressed its concerns about the car-oriented city, acknowledging the growing 
congestion. Hence, the Group developed the Interim Strategy in 1992. A second public 
information/consultation was organized to explain the strategy and get feedbacks from 
the citizens. The final report with technical appendixes was submitted to the government 
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in 1994. The Strategy of Dublin Area was adopted in mid-1995. The DTI 
recommendations for public transportation included: 
• Establishment of Quality Bus Corridors, to increase the quality of service  
• Implementation of a LRT 
 
Expansion and Strategies 
As the DTI also specified, the Dublin Transportation Office (DTO) was set to implement 
the Strategy in November 1995 and effectively started in March 1996. Among its 
prerogatives, the DTO has to coordinate all transportation activities with 7 different 
Departments (Environment, Transportation, Finance, Justice and Road Authorities), to 
monitor the activities (to keep the DTI Strategy) and to start the planning process (with an 
update every 5 years).  
Nevertheless, the long-term strategy had forecast a little growth in travel demand in 
Dublin, but in 1993 the Irish economy started a great expansion cycle, worsening even 
more the current situation. The DTI drafted a short-term action plan, including 150 more 
buses with subsidies and a quick implementation of the QBC. 
 
Entrance 
How the DTO executives won the government confidence to implement the QBC is quite 
unusual. In 1996, during a diner with the Prime Minister, the DTO was asked to plan the 
Christmas situation (when the congestion is particularly critical) and to implement 
measures to scope it. In a month, the DTO produced a plan and achieved to cope the 
usual Christmas disaster. Since, the DTO executives have been meeting once a month 
with the Cabinet Subcommittee on Infrastructures with the Prime Minister and other 
senior Ministers, setting the committee's agenda according to their own agenda. To 
implement the QBC, the DTO organized on each corridor a consultation with the public 
and local authorities. The first four corridors were implemented quite easily, without any 
opposition but the following one encountered fierce opposition in the media, as it was 
passing through a rich neighborhood. The DTO and the different agencies stood strong 
with the feeling that losing this corridor could jeopardize the whole project. It was a 
  Page 79/120 
major success with 160% increase in ridership (including 60% of former car users) and 
the public definitively accepted the implementation of the QBC. 
Eventually in 2000, the Platform for Change started with the goal of a complete public 
transportation integration. It would ultimately replace the DTO as a unique agency in 
charge of planning transportation and land use, and of continuing the DTI's mission. 
 
6.4. Honolulu, USA 
6.4.1. Preferential Treatment Description and Historic 
 
Map 8: Hawaii, USA38 
 
 Miscellaneous 
BRT Expected to be implemented in 2006 
Table 13: Hawaii's Preferential Treatment 39 
Even though preferential treatment has not yet been physically implemented, the 
Honolulu City Council recently approved funding for the first BRT line – ratifying the 
public process – from Iwilei to Waikiki via Kakaako Makai, for the 2003 fiscal year. This 
line could be operational within three years. 
 
6.4.2. Inside Access Model 
Initiation 
In 1995, the City Council rejected (by only one vote of difference) a LRT project 
submitted by the City Department of Transportation. Even though federal money was 
                                               
38
 Source: www.oahutrans2k.com  
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secured, political opposition and lack of support from the bus drivers prevent the project 
to pass. The environmental threat and the growing congestion started to be problematic. 
In July 1997, the City Council also abolished the Honolulu Public Transit Authority, 
created in 1992. On the island, there had been no real political will in public 
transportation before Mayor Jeremy Harris' vision: the island needed Public 
Transportation for 21st century.  
 
Specification 
Hereafter, an intensive planning process – the Oahu Trans 2K – was launched in the fall 
of 1998 as the transportation component of the Honolulu City & County Vision Process. 
The philosophy of this planning exercise was to define the need of the communities. In 
fall 1998, Round 1 scanned all the previous transportation planning. It also consulted 
communities to bring some inputs to the project. A Draft Islandwide Mobility Concept 
Plan was developed based on Round 1. In winter 1998, Round 2 presented the Draft 
Islandwide Mobility Concept Plan to the communities in order to refine it. At this stage it 
became clear that the communities were not supporting any rail option as they were 
against any tax raises. Indeed, the difficult topology of the region would have imposed a 
heavy financial burden in capital investments. In spring 1999, Round 3 was the occasion 
to present the final version of the Islandwide Mobility Concept Plan and the alternatives 
studied in the Major Investment Study / Environmental Impact Statement (MIS/EIS). 
They were three alternatives described in the document: 
• No-Build 
• Transportation System Management 
• Bus Rapid Transit 
 
Expansion and Strategies 
In March 1999, independently to the consultation process, City Express (a limited bus 
service) was successfully implemented in increasing the level-of-service. Planning and 
community consultations had been led prior to the experience. This project allowed the 
                                                                                                                                            
39
 Source: Ibid 
  Page 81/120 
city to apply for the Federal Transit Administration BRT Consortium in the summer 
1999. During Round 4, in fall 1999, the results of the MIS/EIS were presented to the 
community. A consultation was launched on the technical part of the project and the BRT 
alternative was eventually chosen, aiming at the potential federal funds. A last round in 
August 2001 gave the opportunity to present to the public the latest version of the BRT 
project. 
 
Entrance 
The overall reaction to the process was positive. Strong supports rose, like the University 
and the City Board. The opposition groups were limited to rail enthusiasts, hoping to save 
car space but with very few constituency. The Mayor who started the process got briefed 
and set the guidelines, but not really acted as a policy entrepreneur. The funding for phase 
1 should be passed this year and the City Department of Transportation Service is starting 
technical studies on traffic priority and infrastructure. 
 
6.5. Portland, USA 
6.5.1. Preferential Treatment Description and Historic 
 
Map 9: Portland, USA40 
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 Length Miscellaneous 
Bus 
LRT 
1,350 km 
104.5 km 
Exclusive right-of-way: 2.9 km 
9.3 km to be opened in 2004 
Table 14: Portland's Preferential Treatment 41  
 
In 1958, the last streetcar ran in Portland. In 1962, the City voters refused the public 
ownership of Portland Transit system. In 1969, the private company went bankrupted and 
Portland City Council created Tri-Met, a public funded transit company. In 1986, Tri-Met 
started the operation of the first LRT line (Metropolitan Area Express, MAX). A second 
line (Westside) opened in 1998, followed in 2001 by the MAX line to the airport. 
 
6.5.2. Inside Access Model 
Initiation 
In 1969, a regional transportation plan called for a massive highway network. In 1972, 
the Mount Hood Freeway preliminary studies showed a heavy cost for limited 
infrastructure (6.4 km for $400 million in 1974). It also asked for the removal of one 
percent of Portland housing stock. With a central area already congested, the public 
raised concerns during community meetings about bringing new cars in downtown. 
Facing the potential impacts, the Portland City Council withdrew its support to the 
project. The Governor of Oregon then appointed a group, the Transportation Task Force 
to elaborate a new policy. 
 
Specification 
In 1973, Tri-Met led independently a study to elaborate a transportation plan. Quickly 
looking at the different alternatives, it recommended the implementation of a bus system 
with dedicated lanes and traffic priority over a period of 15 years. It was during this study 
that the concept of transit centers was first established. Nevertheless, the Transportation 
Task Force (TTF) published the Interim Transportation Plan (ITP) where it recognized 
the impossibility to accommodate unrestrained car use. Instead, it suggested providing the 
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highway network for off-peak use and developing high-capacity transitways to 
accommodate the extra peak-hour demand.  
At the same time, the LRT technology emerged on the public agenda. First a group 
advocated for the return of streetcars. On the other hand, the State Public Utility 
Commission commissioned an elementary study that recommended LRT with the 
existing rail facilities. 
The Mount Hood Freeway was meant to improve the situation on the Eastside of 
Portland, but the withdraw of the project pushed the TTF to apply for the Interstate 
Transfer Program: the money that would have been spent on highways could be used in 
transit projects instead. The focus went on the Banfield Freeway and the ITP wanted to 
spend some money in limited road capacity improvements and planned a busway. 
 
Expansion and Strategies 
The project went through public consultation and in 1975 the Oregon Transportation 
Department and Tri-Met made a technical study. At this point, the concept of transit 
center appeared to be crucial. Indeed, the previous bus system was an old-fashioned 
radial network and the Tri-Met suggestion was to improve the connectivity in 
reorganizing the system into high-capacity links between the transit centers and a low-
capacity feeder sub-system. The enthusiasm of the public, Tri-Met and the City staff 
influenced the project to include LRT, as it was supported by the forecast. The studies, 
including all alternatives, lasted 2years and in 1978 it recommended capacity 
improvements on Banfield Freeway and the construction of 24 km of LRT.  
 
Entrance 
The project was adopted by the State of Oregon in 1978 providing 17% of the funding. 
The Federal Government provided the other 83% in 1980. The public having been largely 
consulted, the project encountered very few opposition. The traffic priority raised some 
concerns among the City Traffic Department but the policy clearly stated that the LRT 
would stop only at stations. The politicians were also overall supportive, due to the 
consensus that the Columbia Region Association of Government, the powerful 
metropolitan authority, imposed. Mayor Goldsmith and Governor Straub were quite 
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enthusiast about the project. The following Governor Atiyeh, who was against when he 
got elected, rapidly changed its mind and gave his full support to the project. 
Banfield's county (Multnomah) was the first to be served by the LRT. The second county 
(Washington) delayed its studies until the opening of the first line and eventually opened 
its line 12 years after the success of the first line. The last county could not build its line 
because of the statewide vote against (other counties inhabitants were unwilling to pay 
more tax for a system they would not use). Instead the Airport line was constructed with 
private funds. Eventually the line in construction (Interstate Yellow line) was funded with 
local money and the federal money that was not spent on the airport line. 
 
6.6. Ottawa, Canada 
6.6.1. Preferential Treatment Description and Historic 
 
Map 10: Ottawa, Canada42 
 
 Length Miscellaneous 
Bus 2 591 km 
On priority right-of-way: 31 km 
Exclusive lanes: 12.5km  
Busways (fully grade-separated): 2 km 
Table 15: Ottawa's Preferential Treatment 43 
                                               
42
 Source: Jane's Urban Transport System 2002-2003 
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Ottawa is the capital city of Canada and one of the 11 municipalities of the Regional 
Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton (RMOC). In 1969, the Canadian Parliament established 
the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carletton in order to control the urban sprawl. The 
major roles attributed to the RMOC were planning, infrastructure investments and 
providing regional services. In 1972, the RMOC created OC Transpo (Ottawa-Carletton 
Regional Transit Commission) to exclusively operate public transportation in its 
perimeter. Planned in the early 70's, 31 kilometers of Transitway were achieved in 1996, 
completing the existing bus network.  
The transitway is composed of rapid lines, where full priority is given. The express and 
the feeder run to collect riders into the sprawled suburbs, an already developed pattern in 
Ottawa. 
 
6.6.2. Initial Model 
Initiation 
In 1969, the Canadian Parliament established a new elected body in charge of the 
metropolitan area: the RMOC. Among other things, it had the obligation to create an 
extensive land use plan, which would ultimately define the Region's orientations towards 
land use and public transportation policies. 
 
Specification 
During the 60's and the 70's, the public became a fierce opponent to highways projects 
like in most of the major North-American cities. As the Regional Municipality organized 
public consultations to elaborate its plan, the public had expressed its will to freeze road 
capacity and the final plan, approved in October 1974, gave the direction for land use and 
public transportation policies. Cervero (Cervero, 1998b) pointed out that RMOC focused 
on creating a comprehensive plan on the development of the metropolitan area. The plan 
adopted a strategy of a multicenter city linked by transitways. The following figure shows 
the spatial distribution of the centers and the transitways. 
                                                                                                                                            
43
 Source: Jane's Urban Transport System 2002-2003 
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Figure 18: The Region Plan44 
Without any technological choice set, the RMOC really integrated land use and 
transportation in the plan. Indeed, Cervero detailed the future zoning and the location of 
employments. The different centers would be composed of mixed activities and would 
include at least 5000 jobs in a 400-meter range of the transitway. Further technical studies 
were ordered to set the technological choice. In 1975, the Regional Municipality 
Transportation Department made an appraisal study to determine what the city could 
afford, definitely rejecting the heavy rail option. In 1978, the technical study 
recommended Busway or LRT. 
 
Expansion and Strategies 
The implementation strategy was to define the technical choice. Indeed, the RMOC 
Transportation Department wanted the fastest implementation to start the Transit-
Oriented Development. The RMOC was unwilling to spend a lot of money in capital 
investments. Thorough studies were made corridor by corridor to compare LRT and 
Busway, and the bus appeared much cheaper and more flexible to implement. Busways 
could be staged, that is to say that small trunks could be used while waiting for the all 
system to be opened. One of the goals was to minimize the number of transfers, thus the 
bus routes would play the role of feeder as well as rapid and express. Therefore, the 
RMOC chose the bus as a physical link between the nodes. 
 
                                               
44
 Source: Busway and the Hybrid Metropolis: Ottawa. The Transit Metropolis, Robert Cervero, 1998 
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Entrance 
The municipalities' mayors supported the busway project as well the Chair Transportation 
Committee and the Chair Region Committee. The public also gave its support because it 
was convinced by an early example of busway implemented by OC Transpo. They were 
very little opposition in principle, partly because people could remember streetcars 
running not long ago (they stopped service in 1959). The only opposition to rise was 
during the corridors studies in which communities participated to the drawing of the 
alignments. 
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Chapter 7:  Outside Initiative Models: Case Studies 
 
7.1. Zurich, Switzerland 
7.1.1. Preferential Treatment Description and Historic 
 
Map 11:  Zurich, Switzerland45 
 
 Length Miscellaneous 
Bus 111.9 km 
Trolleybus 41 km On priority right-of-way: 12.5 km 
Tramway 108.9 km  
Table 16: Zurich's Preferential Treatment46 
 
Zurich transit system is mainly operated by the VBZ (Verkehrsbetriebe Zürich), a 
municipal corporation enjoying a great autonomy. However in 1990, the ZVV (Züricher 
                                               
45
 Source: EMTA 
46
 Source: Jane's Urban Transport System 2002-2003 
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Verkehrsverbund) was created to supervise the regional planning and the coordination 
between all the transportation actors in the Canton. Extremely dense, Cervero (Cervero, 
1998a) described the transit system as the juxtaposition of three networks: 
• a line-haul system supported by the S-Train (commuter rail) connecting the main 
urban centers 
• a line haul system of buses and intercity rail between the main stations 
• a dense tram coverage within each urban center. 
The density and the redundancy of the system provide frequent service so that no one is 
further than half a kilometer of public transportation and the average waiting time is less 
than five minutes during weekdays. 
 
7.1.2. Initial Model 
Initiation and Specification 
In Zurich, the environment was considered to be a major concern on the public agenda. 
We would argue that it was more the quality of life in a broader sense. Environment is 
part of it, as well as urban patterns, congestion. Zurich citizens were aware that 
automobiles were breaking down their way of life, through sprawl and car dependency, 
and imposing heavy external costs to the society. Since the beginning of the century the 
city has been moving with a dense tramway system but car-created congestion was 
slowing significantly the public transportation. Environment groups were long advocating 
for a mitigation of car use but it was not before 1973 that the issue got on the formal 
agenda.  
 
Expansion and Strategies 
In 1961 the city council, supported by most of the political parties, approved and put to 
referendum a plan aimed at burying  the tram system in order to release it from 
congestion. The population rejected the proposal, worried about the financial cost. The 
Swiss democracy holds a peculiarity: Swiss cherish referendum, as they are consulted 
many times during the years on important issues. In the city of Zurich, investments over 
the threshold of 10 million Swiss Francs (US$ 7 million in 1998) require a referendum 
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approval. In 1973, environmental groups submitted to the public the following 
referendum. 
Public Campaign of 18 June 1973 for the Promotion of Public Transit47 
At the expense of the investment fund, a credit of 200 million francs will be approved to 
permit, in the course of the ten years following the referendum, at a rate of 15 to at most 
25 million francs per year, the financing of structural additions and improvements to the 
network of the transportation company of the City of Zurich, which will serve exclusively 
and substantially to eliminate interference by private traffic and internal problems within 
the companies, so that the vehicles of the VBZ can travel along their lanes or tracks 
virtually as fast as possible… Such directives cover the provision of separate tram and 
bus lanes, the construction and conversion id the important traffic intersections entirely 
to meet the requirements of the VBZ and pedestrians. 
The municipal parliament advises the voters to reject the proposal. 
 
The political class opted for an increase in highway capacity to release congestion and 
suggested a rejection of the transit solution. The public massively voted for the 
proposition, contradicting completely the politicians' will. Financing infrastructure is the 
main point to understand the decision-making process that occurred in Zurich. The two 
referendums were rejected because the financial burden. Joost (Joost, 1994) explains that 
the contradiction between the citizens and their elected officials is due to the 
misrepresentation of the population. Elected officials are generally men over 40, a market 
predominantly dominated by the automobile mode; therefore they tend to be biased when 
they opt for a solution to solve transportation. The focusing event was here the 
referendum and most of all, the city's budget related to this referendum. The particularity 
of Zurich, which allows such outside initiative models, is the frequency and the easy 
access of this focusing event.  
 
Entrance 
During referendums, politicians or other groups suggest and citizens decide. If the 
politicians, first, disagreed with their bases, they did not wait long to back the new plan 
for the city. Ernst Joost, Deputy Director of Zurich Transportation Authority commented 
on the politicians' reaction: "The politics accepted the result, and worked hard to realize 
the intentions of the referendum." Indeed, in 1975 a parliamentary resolution reasserted 
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that priority should be given to public transportation. Also, one must remember that 
giving transit priority was not an easy task at that time. Giving back the full priority 
needed a complete development in terms of technology. The city overcame the barrier in 
investing massively in a traffic signal center to control most of the city traffic light, in 
order to speed up transit. Speeding up transit was not the only measure to make public 
transportation more attractive. Cervero (Cervero, 1998c) detailed the decision-maker 
actions following the referendum results. The city implemented a capacity management 
program for parking and road capacity. On the other hand, they reduced drastically the 
number parking places. Eventually, they froze the city road capacity: any new additional 
road capacity had to be removed and transfer to transit in another parts of the city. In 
addition, the city imposed automobile restrictions by traffic calming in residential 
neighborhoods. 
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Chapter 8:  Analysis 
 
8.1. Hypotheses 
The analysis of the 11 case studies can help us to confirm or invalidate the six hypotheses 
we initially postulated. Table 17 summarizes the different models that have been 
identified in each city and we will come back on each hypothesis to see what we can 
conclude on their validity. 
 Mobilization Model Inside Access Outside Initiative 
C
iti
es
 
London (1964-1986) 
Strasbourg 
Lyon 
Curitiba 
Bogotá 
London (1992-…) 
Manchester 
Dublin 
Honolulu 
Portland 
Ottawa 
Zurich 
Table 17: Case Studies' Models Summary 
 
8.1.1. Hypothesis 1 
"The implementation will rise an important opposition from the public and the 
stakeholders" 
Preferential treatment may appear controversial; however in the 11 case studies, the 
opposition did not compromise the policies. There were indeed some opposition from 
more or less influent interest groups, but the general public never rejected the principles 
of preferential treatment. If there was some opposition, it was only during the designing 
part of the projects when the community inputs could have conflicted with the technical 
requirements. The better illustration remains Dublin where the public was quite 
enthusiastic about the QBC implementation and only one corridor was subject to a fierce 
opposition, which eventually got overcome. 
 
8.1.2. Hypotheses 2 
"A policy entrepreneur in the decision-making body is necessary and sufficient to 
implement preferential treatment" 
In Strasbourg, Lyon, Curitiba and Bogotá, the policy entrepreneur's role was crucial. 
Nevertheless, hypothesis 2 is clearly wrong: London, Dublin, Honolulu, Portland and 
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Ottawa clearly prove that a policy entrepreneur is not necessary to implement preferential 
treatment. Manchester's case, with the emergence of an enthusiast decision-maker – with 
very little direct leverage – seems to show that he helped in giving credit to the process, 
but was neither sufficient nor necessary. Also, Zurich illustrates that the public can even 
contradict the decision-makers and impose its will to implement preferential treatment on 
them.  
 
8.1.3. Hypothesis 3 
"There would be a mobilization scheme (that might follow other models) in the public 
policy-making process to achieve the preferential treatment implementation" 
Since the hypothesis 2 is violated, hypothesis 3 is also wrong for the majority of the cities 
we studied. It remains valid for cities that opted for the mobilization models, as the policy 
entrepreneur converted a failed inside access model into a successful mobilization model.  
 
8.1.4. Hypothesis 4 
"Inside access model, alone, cannot have significant impacts on implementation" 
Most of the cities have implemented preferential treatment with inside access patterns. 
Manchester, Dublin, Honolulu, Portland and Ottawa implemented their policies only 
adopting the inside access model; furthermore London adopted the reverse pattern that 
we expected: first mobilization then inside access. We can also notice that all types of 
preferential treatment have been implemented with inside access models: bus lanes, 
traffic priority, BRT or LRT. 
 
8.1.5. Hypothesis 5 
"Outside initiative model remains rare" 
Hypothesis 5 seems to be true as we could only Zurich has been able to follow this 
model. It seems that outside initiative patterns require either easy access ways for groups 
to put issues on the public agenda or a great constituency. The referendum in Switzerland 
might be one of the few ways to achieve it for transportation issues. We are not sure that 
a larger number of case studies would have allowed us to identify more outside initiative 
models. 
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8.1.6. Hypothesis 6 
"Transportation authorities' roles are limited to providing their planning and technical 
expertise during the process" 
The role of transportation authorities is indeed relatively limited. None clearly initiated 
the policy-making process. However, some brought more than expertise. Two scenarios 
can be defined in function of the agenda-building model. 
On the one hand, in mobilization models in Strasbourg, Lyon and Curitiba the local 
public transportation agencies supervised the technical studies of a choice already set. In 
Bogotá, there was even no public transportation institution. With strong leadership, the 
transit authorities had no needs to step up. 
On the other hand, for inside access models, even though the case studies show that 
transportation authorities were seldom the initiator, some were influent in the mode 
choice. Indeed, the transportation authorities had to wait for an opportunity window and 
afterwards could orientate the issue towards preferential treatment (in Honolulu, Dublin, 
Ottawa, Portland or Manchester); the exception being London, where the LT relaunched 
the implementation. 
 
8.2. Stakeholders 
The starting point of the analysis is to take a closer look at the different actors involved in 
the policy-making process. We can identify four categories of stakeholders that have in a 
way or another took part in the agenda setting: the transportation agencies, the authorities, 
the decision-makers and the public. 
 
8.2.1. Public Transportation Agencies 
Public transportation authorities' roles in preferential treatment remain mixed and 
ambiguous. Indeed, transit or/and planning agencies' emergence in the agenda-building 
process is various and a distinction must be made between the operating and planning 
part of the agencies. Operators were seldom involved in the process, except if they were 
also in charge of the planning (e.g. Tri-Met in Portland). Moreover, the implementations 
of preferential treatment have incurred either the creation of new operators or the 
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reorganization of the current ones. On the other hand, the planning authorities were much 
more involved in the matter. We will look in greater details the issues of planning in 
paragraph 8.4.  
 
8.2.2. Authorities 
Local Authorities 
Local authorities appear to be the most enthusiast and supportive institutions involved in 
preferential treatment implementation because they would indeed get the direct effects of 
an improvement of public transportation in their neighborhoods. Nevertheless, they also 
have limited influence when building a network. The most revealing case is of course 
London, which after 1992 implemented the LBPN with the cooperation of boroughs only. 
Also, the case of Portland particularly underlines the support of local authorities: the first 
two LRT corridors, supported by their respective counties, were confirmed by the local 
public vote; however the last line in the third county – which was not implemented – was 
rejected because submitted to a regional referendum: the other counties withdrew their 
support and refused to pay for a project they would not benefit. Eventually, pilot projects, 
coordinated with municipalities, are a tremendous argument to extend supports to a 
broader scale. Honolulu, Ottawa and London have been able to convince the decision-
makers and the public in implementing geographically limited but successful pilot 
projects. 
 
Metropolitan Authorities 
On the other hand, metropolitan authorities' support for preferential treatment was not as 
clear as local authorities' support. First, the metropolitan authorities have several times 
derailed the implementation due to the lack of consensus. For example in Lyon, the 
COURLY was not able to set a coherent policy orientation during the first attempt to 
implement preferential treatment, leading to a failure. Nevertheless, supportive 
metropolitan authorities have considerably speeded up and strengthened projects. When 
the COURLY eventually reached a consensus, Lyon's LRT got implemented in less than 
2 years. The CUS in Strasbourg, the RMOC in Ottawa and the Columbia Region 
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Association of Government in Portland also proved to be a catalyst for the project's 
entrance. 
 
8.2.3. Decision-Makers 
The attitudes of decision-makers are very mixed towards preferential treatment: some 
being very enthusiastic (becoming in some case entrepreneur), other very skeptical. 
Actually in the case studies, decision-makers did not act as partisan on the subject. The 
left-wing parties implemented LRT in Strasbourg and the right followed, the contrary 
happened in Lyon. In Portland, successive governors ultimately supported the 
implementation of the LRT. However, London may be the exception because the Labour 
Party has been more favorable than the Conservatives. 
On the other hand, Zurich is unique in providing us elements of thoughts on decision-
makers. Indeed, the public disapproved skeptical decision-makers in the 1973 referendum 
and Joost (Joost, 1994) sees in it, the discrepancy between citizens and elected officials. 
According to him, the gap in Zurich was due to the fact that officials are generally males 
over 40: an automobile-dominated market segment. Another survey in France confirms 
the existence of such a gap. The following table (table 18) summarizes the results of a 
poll ordered by several transportation organisms:48 
 Citizens Elected Officials Citizens according Elected Officials 
1996 72% 68% 27% 
2001 69% 84% 43% 
Table 18: Percentage of Positive Answers to the question: "To improve traffic 
conditions, should we limit car use?" 
Even though we find that the gap in France has decreased for the last five years, it is clear 
that there remains a strong gap between the decision-makers and the public in general. 
Unfortunately, such surveys are not available for the other cities, but the role of public 
consultation that will be examined later testifies in favor of this gap. 
 
                                               
48
 Les Déplacements Urbains en Province: un climat favorable aux transports publics, TNSOFRES 
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8.2.4. Public 
As stated earlier, the public was not opposed to the implementation of preferential 
treatment, at least in principles, and the main reason behind this fact is the organization of 
public consultations. The opposition was concentrated among interest groups – with low 
constituency – and neighborhoods negotiating the technical and physical 
implementations. The next paragraph details the role of consultation in winning the 
public's supports. 
 
8.3. Public Consultations 
In 9 cities out of 11 (all but Curitiba and London), public consultations were organized 
prior to the implementation. Two types of public consultations can be distinguished:  
• A local consultation of the public neighboring the implementation (along the 
corridors) insured the public's feedbacks towards the alignments 
• A global consultation, involving the whole city's opinion on the principles of 
preferential treatment.  
The next table (table 19) details which consultations took place in the different cities. 
Local Global 
Strasbourg 
Lyon 
- 
Manchester 
Dublin 
- 
- 
Ottawa 
- 
Strasbourg 
Lyon 
Bogotá 
Manchester 
Dublin 
Honolulu 
Portland 
- 
Zurich 
Table 19: Types of Public Consultations Held in the Case Studies 
Local consultations mostly focused on technical aspects of the corridors. Most of the 
time, they were community meetings to get the neighborhoods' inputs but also to soften 
the NIMBY effects through dialogue.  
On the other hand, some cities have organized citywide consultations:  
• Portland, Bogotá and Zurich put the issue to referendum,  
• Dublin organized a major survey to define its need, 
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• Strasbourg, Lyon and Manchester organized community meetings for all citizens 
(not only in the corridors' perimeter).  
Global consultations were not only aimed at explaining the citizens the will of the 
decision-makers, but also to legitimate the policy. This is particularly true for Bogotá 
where the referendum supported the policy entrepreneur and for Zurich where the public 
rejected the city plans for an underground network.  
Eventually, global consultations can bring in addition to legitimacy, inputs on the city 
desired by the citizen. For example, Dublin and Honolulu opted for preferential 
treatment, following the public interests expressed in the survey or in the community 
meetings. In Portland the consultations reoriented the technical choice from bus lanes to 
LRT. 
 
8.4. Planning 
Planning exercise is a quite interesting issue in the agenda-building process applied to 
preferential treatment. It is particularly relevant on three points: the relations with 
previous planning efforts, the principle of planning and the planning means. 
 
8.4.1. Previous Transportation Planning 
One common thing that we found among the different cities is that planning preferential 
treatment reset all the previous plans. It is true that in Lyon or Bogotá, there had been 
some flavor of preferential treatment before the implementation, but their consequences 
were minor. For London's second implementation process, there was no additional 
planning from the first period, because the second stage really continued the first 
mobilization model. 
The plans that preceded the preferential treatment planning appeared to be much more 
superficial and unrealistic (specially in financial terms). The most striking story is the 
Bogotá's subway project: four different governments ordered studies and plans without 
achieving any implementation. Also, the case of Dublin is particularly relevant: lot of 
planning but very few implementations over the years. 
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Generally, there had been a strong shift in the planning orientation: Portland and Curitiba 
dropped highways for LRT; Bogotá, Manchester, Lyon and Strasbourg moved from 
underground rail to at-grade systems.  
Dublin is the only city that has tried to resolve this planning issue. When establishing the 
transportation strategy for Dublin, the necessity of an on-going planning process was 
included to avoid the recurrence of plans without implementation. In addition to a long-
term plan (20 years), five-year plans were also to be drawn in order to update the strategy 
with the evolution of the city. 
 
8.4.2. Transportation Planning or City Planning? 
Another interesting learning from the case studies is the essence of planning. In other 
words, what underlying issues were driving the planning exercise? From the eleven cities 
studied, two different streams can be determined: 
1. Transportation Planning 
2. City Planning 
In the first case, the whole issue of preferential treatment was to improve the public 
transportation network. The second stream implied a broader sense of planning: "what 
type of city must be developed?" Table 20 sorts the case studies in function of their 
planning essence. 
 
Transportation 
Planning City Planning 
Lyon 
London 
Strasbourg 
Honolulu 
Manchester 
Portland 
Dublin  
Bogotá 
Curitiba 
Ottawa 
Table 20: Type of Planning Led in the Case Studies 
Only Lyon and London focused their plans on the transportation issues. Not surprisingly 
to see that they are also the two cities that already had a subway network, therefore a 
culture of public transportation.  
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In the other cities, the planning of preferential treatment was strongly correlated to the 
planning of a new type of city. Within this stream, we can also distinguish several 
approaches: 
• In Curitiba, Portland, Ottawa and Dublin, the central question of city planning 
preceded the transportation issue. First the actors agreed on the desirable shape of 
the city, then they focused on building the transportation system that would fitted 
the best in their city's plans; 
• In Manchester, Strasbourg, Honolulu and Bogotá, the transportation and city 
planning came simultaneously. The city would change with the construction of 
the system; this is to say that the transportation tool was the vector of change for 
the city. 
In the lasts stream, only Bogotá and Curitiba explicitly set up the urban planning 
concerns first. In the other cities, the implementations of preferential treatment were the 
catalyst of a desire to reshape the urban fabric. The quality of life concerns rose only 
explicitly during or after the physical implementation. 
 
8.4.3. Planning Actors 
An interesting finding from the case studies is the distribution of the planning roles. Table 
21 identifies and summarizes the authorities that led the planning of the preferential 
treatment. 
Local/Metropolitan 
Authorities 
Public Transportation 
Agencies Land Use Agencies 
Strasbourg (CUS) 
Bogotá 
London (GLC) 
Honolulu 
Portland 
Ottawa (RMOC) 
Lyon (SYTRAL) 
London (LT) 
Manchester (GMPTE) 
Dublin (DTO) 
Curitiba (IPPUC) 
Table 21: Organs Responsible for the Planning 
It is hard to find a pattern according the agenda-building models when looking at the 
planning actors. A lot of planning was carried out by authorities' departments mostly 
because their public transportation agencies were not entitled to. Indeed Bogotá, 
Honolulu, Strasbourg and Ottawa had either no transit agencies or only operators; 
Portland had created Tri-Met very lately. On the other hand, in Lyon, London and 
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Manchester, the transit authorities were explicitly responsible for planning and took 
actively part in the process. In Dublin, the DTO was created as a direct consequence of 
the DTI to plan the transportation in the city. Eventually, Curitiba appears as an exception 
at it is a land use agency that planned transportation, which is quite logic given that 
Curitiba was building the city to fit into the transportation system. 
The logic behind those choices might seem unclear but we can say that the agency in 
charge of the planning was either close to the policy entrepreneur (in Strasbourg, Curitiba 
and Bogotá) or institutionally legitimate (SYTRAL, RMOC or LT). Eventually, it is very 
unlikely to see the operator takes the role, as generally they do not have the human and 
knowledge resources for such tasks. 
 
8.5. The French National Policies  
Two French cities offer relevant case studies in terms of preferential treatment 
implementation, thus it is useful to give first a brief background of the national policy 
before analyzing it. Indeed, Strasbourg and Lyon moved towards preferential treatment at 
different periods with different national legislative background and it is interesting to 
understand the influence of the national policies on the local public policy-making 
process. 
 
8.5.1. Legislative Background 
Decentralization Process, Emergence of Local Powers 
France had always concentrated its political decisions in Paris, leaving very few 
initiatives to the local powers. However, in 1982 the national government passed the 
Decentralization Act, aiming at strengthening local powers by attributing them broader 
responsibilities, among others in transportation. From this time, the government also 
passed a gamut of acts orienting the local transportation policy. 4 levels of government in 
France are in charge of transportation: 
• The National Government,  
• The Region,  
• The Department,  
• The City. 
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The multiplicity of powers at a regional scale (between the city, the department and the 
region) was then a source of confusion due to a lack of global coherence. 
 
Loi d'Orientation des Transports Intérieurs (LOTI) 
Shortly after the Decentralization Act, the government adopted the "Loi d'Orientation des 
Transports Intérieurs (LOTI)" or Domestic Transportation Orientation Act defining an 
extensive transportation policy. The LOTI set the principle of "the right to transportation 
for all" and the necessity of mode choice. It also emphasized strongly on the public 
transportation. The cities or municipalities associations were designed to organize urban 
public transportation, through the "Autorités Organisatrices" or Transportation 
Authorities inside the "Perimètre de Transports Urbains (PTU)" or Urban Transportation 
Perimeter. The government also allocated funds for these responsibilities in allowing the 
cities to collect a tax: Versement Transport (VT). Already implemented in Paris since 
1977, it is a tax imposed on firms with more than 9 employees that are located in the 
PTU. Finally, the LOTI included the necessity of a medium range intermodal planning 
through the creation of the "Plan de Déplacements Urbains" (PDU) or Urban Mobility 
Plan. However, the lack of incentives and obligations limited the scope of the PDU. 
 
Loi sur l'Air 49 
In 1996, the increasing congestion and pollution problems in urban centers led the French 
government to reform the LOTI by the "Loi sur l'Air" or Clean Air Act. The initiatives of 
the PDU were not meeting the expectations; therefore the act imposed the creation of a 
PDU for every municipality with more than 100 000 inhabitants before 2000. Moreover, 
the Loi sur l'Air defined strong orientation for the PDU: 
• Decrease of the automobile traffic 
• Development of mass transit and alternative non-polluting modes (like walking 
and cycling) 
• Organization of parking supply inside the PTU, depending on the right-of-ways 
hierarchy 
                                               
49
 Loi sur l'Air 30-12-96 
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• Incentives for employers to favor public transportation and car-pooling 
Public aids are now conditioned on the elaboration of the PDU by local governments. 
 
Solidarité et Renouvellement Urbain (SRU)50 
The "Solidarité et Renouvellement Urbain" (SRU) Act or Solidarity and Urban Renew 
was adopted in 2000 aiming at renovating the urban policies by combining for the first 
time urban, housing and mobility matters, inside the perimeter of the town. The act 
translates the State's will to promote a more coherent local policy. The Act introduces the 
notion of sustainable development at the urban scale. It tackles the constant urban sprawl 
and the accessibility equity in the cities structures. 
On its mobility component, it strengthens a sustainable mobility policy. It makes changes 
in the urban planning by the establishment of the "Plan Local d'Urbanisme" (PLU) or 
Local Urbanism Plan that must be put in compatibility with PDU.  
 
8.5.2. A National Policy to Support Local Authorities51 
The French government had limited its local transportation policies to financing 
infrastructure and technology development. However, with the implementation of the 
legislative context, its position completely shifted from imposing to supporting. 
 
The Inefficiency of the LOTI Act 
Although it emphasized on the matter of public transportation, the LOTI Act was not 
giving very specific means and actions. As a matter of facts, it was quite ahead of its 
time: it suggested a multimodal planning when most of the policies were still sector-
based, hence the inefficiency. 45 cities established a PDU after the LOTI Act was passed, 
with 50% subsidies by the government. As the funding for public transportation projects 
was conditioned on the PDU, it became more or less a tool to justify expenses. The 
subsidies were stopped in 1986, with the return of the right to the power and never came 
                                               
50
 Loi nE 2000–1208 du 13 décembre 2000. Promulgation de la loi relative à la solidarité et au 
renouvellement urbain, Communiqué de presse 14/12/200. 
51
 Interview with Chantal Duchene 
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back even after the left retook the power in 1988. Nevertheless, the LOTI Act also 
implemented 6 pilot projects on urban transportation, including Nantes and Grenoble. 
 
Nantes and Grenoble: Success Stories 
Nantes was the first city in France to reopen a tramway line in 1986, and Grenoble 
followed shortly after, in 1987. Both benefited from the pilot projects but also from 
entrepreneurial mayors, who achieved to implement successfully preferential treatment. 
This appears to be the trigger: Nantes and Grenoble showed to the State that they wanted 
autonomy on developing their city and they no longer wanted the State to impose its 
technological and expensive projects. As the local authorities had started to organize 
themselves, they also asked not to limit the PDU to infrastructure but to expand it to 
urban policy-making. 
 
Loi sur l'Air: To Redefine the LOTI Act 
After the municipal elections in 1989, with the emergence of new mayoral teams, cities – 
including Strasbourg and Lyon – consulted the State's technical services to launch a new 
urban policy-making and the PDU surfaced back. In 1994, as we mentioned in Lyon's 
case study, the Circulaire Idrac52 set the State subventions to only 15% for Heavy Rail 
but 40% for LRT (or other surface preferential treatment). Since 1993, the government 
had launched a broad consultation with local authorities to improve the LOTI and the 
experiences in Nantes and Grenoble strengthened the decentralized authorities' position. 
Eventually in 1996 the Loi sur l'Air was passed with a broad political consensus, like the 
LOTI. Furthermore, the lawmakers all agreed not only to control car traffic but also to 
decrease it. It is worth pointing out that the preferential treatment was included in an 
environmental act only because of the parliamentary agenda (the transportation act that 
preceded focused on European deregulation issues). 
 
                                               
52
 Circulaire Idrac: It is a decree named after Mme Idrac, Director of Direction des Transports Terrestres 
(DTT), who wrote it. 
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8.5.3. Towards a Generalization of Preferential Treatment 
The main lesson from the national policies in France is the evolution of the State position 
in the process. It moved from imposing to supporting. Nantes and Grenoble's experiences 
were quite difficult to replicate in other cities and the French government recognized that 
trying to impose policies was ineffective. Instead of trying to generalize the cases of 
Nantes and Grenoble, the government built a framework to allow the local authorities to 
develop their own initiatives through the availability of funds and by providing the 
necessary technical expertise. Moreover, the framework got reinforced in 2000 with the 
SRU to include land use planning to the transportation. 
Consequently, the CERTU (Centre d'Etudes sur les Réseaux, les Transports et 
l'Urbanisme) has listed 41 projects of preferential treatment in 25 French cities in July 
2002. The national framework has indeed converted transit preferential treatment from a 
pioneer cities' policy into the dominant model.  
One of the trends underlying this fact is that the PDU now offers a useful tool to decision-
makers and technocrats. The TNSOFRES survey53 also addresses this issue. 
 Citizens Elected Officials Technicians 
2001 37% 55% 55% 
Table 22: Percentage of Positive Answers to the question: "Will we succeed to limit car 
use in cities by the year 2010?" 
According to the survey, table 22 shows that elected officials and technicians feel more 
confident in achieving a more general mitigation of car use than citizens, mainly because 
they are more confident in the PDU process. 
 
8.6. Other National Policies 
8.6.1. The Irish Initiative 
The National Initiative (DTI) launched by the Irish government – with the support of 
European funding – made up the focusing event for transportation policy in Dublin. It 
was not aimed at resolving the capital's transportation problem; it was more focused on 
creating an environment where local stakeholders could address transportation and 
                                               
53
 Les Déplacements Urbains en Province: un climat favorable aux transports publics, TNSOFRES 
  Page 107/120 
broader issues. In a certain sense, it is comparable to the PDU process in France in 
building a supportive network; but much more punctual. 
 
8.6.2. The British National Context 
On the contrary, the British legislative context had not been in favor of the 
implementation of preferential treatment – until lately. The abolishment of the 
metropolitan authorities in 1986 (GMC and GLC) weakened the current policy-making 
process. The mobilization model in London stopped as a result and turned into an inside 
access model with the cooperation of the boroughs. In Manchester, the 1986 Act 
dissolved a crucial actor (the GMC) in the process. What happened in Great Britain is 
exactly the contrary of the other European evolutions (among other France) where the 
local authorities are pushed to concentrate into metropolitan authorities. However, the 
case studies may show that a metropolitan authority is important but London and 
Manchester proves that it is not an absolute necessity. We have to admit that the policy-
making process gets harder when we look at the implementation in London; nevertheless 
strong emphasis on municipalities' cooperation can overcome this problem. Eventually, 
the new legislation reestablishing central authorities (TfL and the GLA in London) is now 
creating a much more favorable context for the implementation preferential treatment. 
 
8.7. Benchmarking 
8.7.1. Experiences From Other Cities 
It happens that benchmarking played a significant role in Manchester, Strasbourg, Lyon 
and Bogotá. Indeed, during the policy-making process, decision-makers from Manchester 
and Strasbourg made field trips to other cities to evaluate preferential treatment. In Lyon, 
it is likely that the experiences in Nantes, Strasbourg and Grenoble (only 90 km from 
Lyon) have pushed the decision-makers to think about LRT. In Bogotá, Enrique Peñalosa 
explicitly wrote in 1985 that Bogotá needed a system like Quito or Curitiba. 
This type of benchmarking is particularly efficient to convince decision-makers because 
preferential treatment is no more a concept in their mind, but a successful policy. Indeed, 
when decision-makers are to compare heavy modes with preferential treatment that 
performs at the same level-of-service, they tend to support the most feasible project. In 
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Strasbourg, the underground Light Rail which had been on the agenda was definitely 
removed after elected officials found that that at-grade LRT could bring the same level-
of-service for much less money. The same happened in Manchester, where councilors 
had the opportunity to compare LRT, BRT and Heavy Rail systems in Europe and North 
America. 
 
8.7.2. The FTA and the E.U. 
There is also another type benchmarking that the case studies points out. In Europe and in 
the U.S.A., respectively the European Commission and the FTA gave supports to the idea 
of preferential treatment. 
First, the European Commission issued the European White Paper on Transportation 
(European White Paper, 2001), which gives a general sense of the European 
transportation policy, supporting the idea of giving priority to public transportation 
networks. Only carrying recommendations, the White Paper is generally perceived as a 
reference for E.U. members, trying to promote change through best practices around the 
continent. Obviously, the impacts of the White Paper on local agendas are not triggering 
new policies; nevertheless it brings some legitimacy and cities can broach the subject 
serenely. 
On the other hand, FTA BRT Consortium was launched to promote the implementation 
of BRT in the USA, mainly following Curitiba's experience. Several pilot projects in U.S. 
cities were funded through this program. It also created a network to support technically 
transportation authorities by favoring contacts between cities and by pushing to share the 
information on the projects. The interviewee in Honolulu clearly admitted that the FTA's 
opportunity had been crucial for the implementation of a BRT, as it helped on the 
financial and the technical aspects. 
 
8.8. Funding 
8.8.1. An Omnipresent Constraint 
It is not surprising to find that financial investments were in almost all cases an issue 
(except in Dublin). All the cities were confronted with budget constraints, but several 
situations can be distinguished.  
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First, Lyon and London were already running an underground heavy rail network. Lyon 
had already faced overrun costs in the subway implementation and was not willing at all 
to spend any huge amount of money for limited infrastructures. London Underground 
was built well before the WWII, when capital investments were affordable for a large 
city. The decision-makers acknowledge that the heavy rail expansion, though efficient in 
dense areas, would bring only marginal benefits at a high price. 
On the other hand, Manchester, Portland, Ottawa and Strasbourg have in a way or in 
another made financial comparison between the different modes. The affordability of the 
infrastructure was a recurrent issue during the policy-making process in those cities. The 
decision-makers eventually accepted the trade-offs between financial feasibility and 
political feasibility. 
Also, the financial burden translated into tax rise was also crucial in the rationalization of 
investments. Honolulu, Zurich and Portland saw their citizen clearly refused any rise in 
taxes to finance an expensive public transportation system. 
Finally, Bogotá and Curitiba's BRT were implemented mainly on the financial 
arguments. Both cities, in developing countries, could not afford an expensive rail 
system, and a bus system was the only alternative that would not have outrageously 
indebted the cities. 
Cobb and Coughlin (Cobb and Coughlin, 1997) are raising the issue of affordability in 
transportation projects. Looking at the Maglev projects, they points out that a cheap 
scheme is much more attractive than an expensive one. Moreover, heavy financial burden 
tends to be the easiest way to derail transportation projects. It is particularly true in the 
case studies where cities looking at the heavy rail option all dropped the projects for cost 
reasons. 
 
8.8.2. The FTA and the E.U. 
The FTA and the European Union also played a role – quite limited though – in the 
financial aspects of preferential treatment. In Honolulu, the funds made available by the 
FTA through the BRT Consortium strengthened the process to implement preferential 
treatment. The availability of federal money was alleviating the city's and the citizen's 
financial burden. On the other hand, the Dublin Transportation Initiative was 85% funded 
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by the E.U. Although the funding was limited to the planning stage (and not in the 
infrastructure), Dublin moved through a process of identifying the city's needs. It can be 
noticed that Dublin is the only city not to have face strong budget constraints, given that 
the Irish government was willing to spend money to improve transportation in the capital 
city. 
 
8.9. Triggers, Focusing Events and Policy Windows 
The agenda-building theory puts a strong emphasis on the external factors that influence 
the process such as triggers, focusing events or policy windows. The different case 
studies bring interesting elements to these peculiar aspects of agenda setting. 
 
8.9.1. Triggers 
Triggers are definitely hard to identify in the process. In fact, even the initiator of the 
process himself often is hard to identify. For the 11 case studies, none of the triggers has 
been identified in any models. Only in mobilization models it can be inferred about 
triggers, because the initiator can, in those cases, also be the policy entrepreneur. In 
Strasbourg and in Bogotá, we can assume that benchmarking with other cities acted as 
triggers on the policy entrepreneurs. 
 
8.9.2. Focusing Events 
On the other hand, focusing events are more easily identifiable. As a matter of facts, there 
are quite homogenous in the different cities. Environment or/and congestion seem to have 
reach the public agenda in all the cities. Indeed, urban transportation is nowadays related 
to the environment and quality of life issues: growing congestion, air pollution... In 
addition to that, the budget constraint has also been a strong focusing event in some 
cities. For example, in Honolulu, the FTA consortium appeared also as the focusing event 
by bringing a solution to the financial issue. Eventually, in the Irish capital, the Dublin 
Transportation Initiative played the role of a focusing event in creating an opportunity for 
transportation actors to bring new ideas on the agenda.  
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8.9.3. Policy Windows 
Due to the limited number of mobilization models, we have not been able to spot many 
policy windows. However, there were some interesting situations. In Bogotá and 
Strasbourg, it is definitely the policy entrepreneur's elections; indeed the campaigns took 
the entrepreneurial policy on the public agenda and got legitimized by the elections. In 
Curitiba, it is hard to talk about a policy window; Lerner just imposed his vision without 
any warnings or dialogues. In Lyon, the entrepreneur did not need a policy windows as 
the process was much more consensual than the other mobilization models. 
 
8.10. Developing Countries: The Cases of Curitiba and Bogotá 
Curitiba and Bogotá are the only developing cities that we were able to write a case study 
on. Even if we used the same methodology to dissect their policy-making process, there 
remains a structural difference that arose in the case studies: the stakes do not bear the 
same weights. The underlying reason is that the public transportation constituency is 
much stronger in developing countries. Schafer and Victor (Schafer and Victor, 1998) 
showed that the level of income could explain the level of motorization. The richer a 
country gets, the higher the traffic volume is. Furthermore, the mobility shifted at the 
same time to cars in urban centers. In developing countries, the majority of people are 
still relying on public transportation.  
It is not to say that car-drivers in developing countries are less influential; on the 
contrary, car-owners generally belong to the upper class of the population, and often are 
the one holding the power. Nevertheless their proportion in the population is much lower 
than in developed countries' cities.  
Thus, when analyzing Bogotá and Curitiba, the structural difference is that cars are not as 
present in the people life as in other developed cities (in 1998, 58% of the "Bogotanos" 
were public transportation users54). The car lobby is of course influential but its 
constituency is weaker than public transportation users'. The case of Bogotá is 
particularly relevant where Peñalosa organized a referendum to legitimate his action 
                                               
54
 Source: Millennium Cities Database, UITP, 2001. The percentage only takes into account the mode share 
between motorized modes. 
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against the car lobby, which pushed to impeach him. In developed countries, it would 
hardly be replicable because the majority of people are already sitting in cars. 
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Chapter 9:  Conclusion 
9.1. Why the Mobilization Model is not the Dominant Model 
Cobb, Ross and Ross (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1977) expects the two following hypotheses 
in the model patterns:  
• "The greater the concentration of wealth and status in a society, the more likely 
the inside initiative pattern will predominate" 
• "The more hierarchical a society, the more likely the mobilization pattern will 
predominate" 
Looking at preferential treatment context and the agenda-building theory, it was also 
expected that the mobilization model would predominate, however the case studies 
proved us wrong. Are Cobb, Ross and Ross' hypotheses wrong? No, the case studies tend 
to show that the preferential treatment context is generally misunderstood. There are two 
main reasons why our hypotheses were not verified. The first one is theoretical, in other 
words related to the models; the second one is in the order of practicality: what is the 
current transit reality with respect to implementation. 
 
9.2. Theoretical Issues  
9.2.1. A Mobilization Model but Without a Policy Entrepreneur? 
A new kind of models surfaces in the case studies. Indeed, there were several cities that 
initiated their policy-making process by the decision-makers, without anyone in particular 
being an entrepreneur. In London (1962-1986), Manchester, Ottawa, Portland, Dublin 
and Honolulu, the body of decision-makers agreed with quite a consensus to support 
preferential treatment implementation. Afterwards, the process turned either into an 
inside access if the transportation authority took over or kept going as a mobilization 
model in London. This last case brings new arguments to the agenda-setting theoretical 
hypotheses in sense that it combines two of the models. 
 
9.2.2. Mixing Mobilization and Inside Access Models 
Cobb, Ross and Ross (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1977) envisioned that agenda-building 
theory could include a mixture of the three models identified earlier. The case of London 
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between 1962 and 1986 now points out that most of the other cities did not strictly 
followed only one model. We represent on figure 19 the different cities on a scale ranging 
from a pure mobilization model to a pure inside access one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Case Studies in the Gamut of Models 
It happens that the majority of models includes a mix of the theoretical models.  
Curitiba, Bogotá and Strasbourg could be classified unambiguously as mobilization 
models, because of a strong leadership in the process. On the other hand, Lyon's 
entrepreneur did not support the process alone because he relied on the SYTRAL.  
The current process in London is the only on that could be classified as inside access. In 
the other cities included in the inside access chapter, there was an action from the 
decision-makers that initiated the process: the DTI, Harris' vision in Honolulu or the 
actions taken by the regional elected body in Ottawa and Portland. 
Eventually, the most ambiguous cases are Manchester and London (1962-1986); hitherto 
they were respectively classified as inside access and mobilization but in Manchester the 
GMC led the process (yet relying on the GMPTE) and in London there was no policy 
entrepreneur identified. 
 
9.3. Practical Issues 
9.3.1. Transportation: a growing concern for the citizens 
In the hypotheses, we assumed that preferential treatment was an unpopular measure and 
that the policy-makers would encounter fierce opposition to any policy limiting car use. It 
might have been true two decades ago, but nowadays, urban transportation issues are 
London (1994-...) 
Mobilization Inside Access 
Curitiba 
Bogotá 
Strasbourg 
Ottawa 
Portland 
Dublin 
Honolulu 
Lyon 
Manchester 
London (1962- 1986) 
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becoming a growing source of concerns. The survey done by the TNSOFRES in France 
confirms this trend:55 
 Citizens Elected Officials 
1996 58% 72% 
2001 72% 81% 
Table 23: Percentage of Positive Answers to the question: "Transportation and traffic, a 
growing problem?" 
The case studies give some elements of answer to why transportation is getting more 
attention from the public. The underlying issue of urban quality of life drives these 
growing public concerns. Indeed, the environment and the congestion are often related to 
the public transportation issue and tend to catch the attention of a broader segment of the 
population. On the other hand, the argument of increasing road capacity is losing support 
because the public recognizes the unsustainability of this solution: the continuous 
increase in road capacity never really scoped the congestion issue. Portland Zurich's 
citizens found out relatively early, in the 1970's, and this feeling tends to spread to other 
cites. The survey by TNSOFRES also shows that French citizens are also aware of the car 
limits in the urban context. 
 Citizens Elected Officials 
2001 70% 75% 
Table 24: Percentage of Positive Answers to the question: "Cars in cities have more 
disadvantages than benefits?" 
 
9.3.2. Towards an integration of transportation issues 
The other hypothesis that can lead to erroneous judgment is to think that urban 
transportation policy is hierarchical and clustered. It used to be, when public 
transportation and highway policies were completely independent processes, run by rival 
agencies. Nevertheless, the case studies points out that cities are moving towards an 
integrated policy in urban transportation. This has resulted into better relations between 
the different institutions. The strongest example is the PDU in France that really imposed 
an intermodal planning for major cities. Moreover, in the Dublin the establishment of the 
DTO expressed the political will to concentrate the transportation policies (at least the 
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coordination) into a single agency. In London, the period of institutional breaking up is 
now leaving the place to a stronger public transportation agency (TfL) and a centralized 
metropolitan authority (GLA). Was the preferential treatment responsible for this trend? 
Responsible seems a little strong, but surely it acted as a catalyst. Indeed, managing the 
implementation of preferential treatment needs institutional cooperation but the trend can 
be broadened to other public transportation systems.  
 
9.4. Further Research 
9.4.1. The Absence of Outside Initiative Case Studies 
Zurich was not considered here because of its singular characteristics. If we had found 
more outside initiative cases, mixed with other types of models, we would have been able 
to integrate an third dimension to our scale. A further research could include such models 
in looking at policy closely related to preferential treatment, such as pedestrian areas or 
urban tolls. 
 
9.4.2. Inside Access Entrepreneurs? 
This thesis points out that entrepreneurs can arise from non-decision-making groups. An 
interesting follow-up would be to focus on how people inside an administration could 
achieve subsequent policy-making towards the implementation. 
 
9.4.3. The American Exceptionalism 
Further investigations could be led on the situation in the USA. Unfortunately, only 
Portland and Honolulu' case studies brought elements of thoughts on an American 
perspective. Nevertheless, the multiplication of preferential treatment in San Diego, San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, Cleveland or Pittsburg seems to testify against the American 
peculiarity. To our knowledge, none of the cities quoted above followed a mobilization 
model – that we can expect because of the fragmentation of decision-making, main 
source of exceptionalism. 
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9.4.4. Quantifying The Policy 
An interesting perspective would be the link between policy analysis and operational 
improvements. With enough cases and data availability, future works could isolate the 
effects of preferential treatment (with respect to policy) on transit ridership, commercial 
speed, level-of-service… 
 
9.4.5. Agenda-Building Models For Other Topics 
Eventually, the framework of agenda-building models offers a strong methodology to 
make some research on policies related to public transportation. Some further researches 
using agenda-buildings models could bring significant knowledge on issues such as 
parking, pedestrian areas, zoning… 
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Acronyms 
AVL:  Automated Vehicle Location 
BRT:  Bus Rapid Transit 
COURLY: COmmunauté URbaine de LYon 
CTS:  Compagnie des Transports Strasbourgeois 
CUS:  Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg 
DTI:  Dublin Transportation Initiative 
DTO:  Dublin Transportation Office 
ELTIS: European Local Transport Information Service 
FTA:  Federal Transit Authority 
GLA:  Greater London Authority 
GLC:  Greater London Council 
GMC:  Greater Manchester Council 
GMPTE: Greater Manchester  
GPS:  Global Positioning System 
IPPUC: Instituto de Planejamento Urbano de Curitiba 
ITP:  Interim Transportation Plan 
LBPN:  London Bus Priority Network 
LOTI:  Loi d'Orientation des Transports Intérieurs 
LRT:  Light Rail Transit 
LT:  London Transport 
MAX:  Metropolitan Area Express 
MIS/EIS: Major Investment Study / Environmental Impact Statement 
MPO:  Metropolitan Planning Authority 
OC Transpo: Ottawa-Carletton Regional Transit Commission 
PRN:  Priority Route Network 
PTA:  Passenger Transport Authority 
QBC:  Quality Bus Corridor 
RMOC: Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carletton 
SRU:  Solidarité et Renouvellement Urbain 
SYTRAL: SYndicat de TRansports de l'Agglomération Lyonnaise 
  Page 120/120 
TfL:  Transport for London 
TTF:  Transportation Task Force 
UITP:  Union Internationale des Transports Publics (International Association for 
Public Transport) 
VBZ:  Verkehrsbetriebe Zürich 
ZVV:  Züricher Verkehrsverbund 
